HF emergency communications
Infrastructure-independent HF networks
Overview
Resilient high-frequency communication networks that work when everything else is down: no towers, no satellites, no subscriptions. Compact, field-repairable HF transceivers with open architecture, deployable as national emergency and contingency networks for civil defence and remote operations.
A national fallback network that works when towers, satellites and subscriptions do not: HF communications with no infrastructure between the two radios.
Capabilities
- Resilient HF networks for civil defence, contingency and remote operations
- Compact, field-repairable transceivers with open architecture
- Deployable as a standing national emergency network
- Operates independently of any commercial or foreign-owned infrastructure
- Delivers a communications capability that survives the loss of towers, satellites and subscriptions: resilience no adversary or disaster can switch off
Specifications
| Type | HF emergency communications network |
| Dependency | None: no towers / satellites / subscriptions |
| Hardware | Field-repairable, open architecture |
| Origin | Independent / non-aligned |
In depth
A link without towers
The product record defines the network's dependency boundary plainly: high-frequency communication needs no towers, satellites, subscriptions or recurring fees between the two radios. That makes it relevant to civil defence, contingency and remote operations where commercial infrastructure is absent, unavailable or not the network the operator is able to use. It is described as a resilient HF network rather than as a replacement for every other communications system. The hardware is compact, field-repairable and open architecture. It operates independently of commercial or foreign-owned infrastructure, according to the catalogue. The product is therefore a network and deployment use case built around infrastructure-independent HF radios, not a claim about one fixed radio model or a published coverage distance. The record supports the absence of towers, satellites and subscriptions, while site design, antenna arrangement and operating procedures remain matters for configuration.
A planned fallback network
The stated deployment is a standing national emergency network for civil defence and contingency operations. Other listed configurations include remote operations and communications beyond commercial coverage. Planning the fallback in advance means defining the stations, antennas, power arrangements, operating procedures and trained users before a tower outage, satellite denial or infrastructure gap creates the requirement. None of those site-specific details is supplied as a universal specification in the catalogue. The source is independent and non-aligned. The product detail lists one accountable team from first briefing through delivery and in-region sustainment, while the hardware is described as field-repairable and open architecture. The buyer can therefore scope the network around its own emergency, remote and contingency roles, then assess training, spares and maintenance as part of the engagement. The record supports infrastructure independence and repairability. It does not establish a particular national deployment, customer or guaranteed availability under every disaster condition.
Build the fallback before the outage
The network is intended to be arranged as a standing capability for civil defence, contingency work and remote operations. Its defining condition is that there is no tower, satellite, subscription or recurring fee between the communicating HF radios. That makes the network independent of the commercial or foreign-owned infrastructure named in the product description. It does not make the network self-configuring. Stations, antennas, power, procedures and users still have to be defined for the national or remote operating requirement. The hardware boundary is compact, open architecture and field-repairable. The support boundary is an independent, non-aligned source with one accountable team from briefing through delivery and in-region sustainment. Those facts support a procurement path that treats the network as an owned emergency layer rather than a subscription service. No coverage distance, station count or disaster availability figure is published. Such values would depend on the specific network design and cannot be added to the product record without further evidence.
Infrastructure independence is the requirement
The network is suited to the moment when ordinary communications infrastructure is unavailable or outside the operator's control. Civil-defence users can define it as a national emergency layer. Contingency planners can define it as a fallback for disrupted services. Remote operators can use the same infrastructure-independent principle where towers, satellites and subscriptions are not present. These are the three stated deployment contexts, not claims of a named deployment. The open architecture and field-repairable design affect sustainment. The buyer can scope maintenance, spares and training around a radio network that is not dependent on a commercial or foreign-owned service chain. The source is independent and non-aligned, with one accountable team through delivery and in-region sustainment. The product record stops at that evidence boundary. It does not publish the network's range, station count, antenna design or performance in a particular emergency, so those questions require a configuration discussion rather than a made-up figure.
Why Unstrat: the difference
Unstrat is the authorised global representative and distributor for this capability. It is already in service with a track record behind it, so you are buying something that has done the job elsewhere, not funding a first attempt. You are not the test bed.
Independent, non-aligned origin, with no political exposure to any major-power ecosystem.
One accountable team from first briefing through delivery and in-region sustainment.
No towers, no satellites, no recurring fees, nothing an adversary or disaster can take down.
How it reaches you
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Procurement & sustainment
Classification and the end-user-certificate chain are confirmed before this capability is represented to your market.
Sourced from an independent manufacturer: no major-power disclosure rules or political conditions.
A single team responsible from first briefing through delivery: not a chain of foreign primes to integrate yourself.
Lifecycle support and operator training delivered in-region, building capability that outlasts the initial deployment.
Questions buyers ask
What is an HF emergency communications network?
It is a national radio network that needs nothing between the two stations: no towers, no satellites, no subscriptions. HF propagation depends on the ionosphere rather than on infrastructure, so two radios and their antennas are the entire system. Ours are built from compact, field-repairable transceivers with open architecture and are in service for civil defence, contingency and remote operations. The planning assumption is a bad day, not a good one.
Best HF radio network for civil defence
Barrett and Codan are credible HF houses and their datasheets are honest about what they do, including Barrett's 125 and 150 W base configurations that we do not match. The case for ours is structural. Compact, field-repairable transceivers with open architecture let a ministry build, extend and repair the network with its own people, with no option codes gating features and no export classification written by a third country. Ask all three of us for published power, environmental qualification and reliability figures, and note who answers.
HF radio or satellite for emergency communications?
Both, with HF as the layer that survives the loss of the other. Satellite gives you bandwidth HF cannot approach, and it also gives you a constellation operator who answers to a foreign regulator. HF has no recurring airtime charge, which Barrett states plainly in its own catalogue, and no billing relationship to keep alive during a crisis. We position our HF networks for exactly that fallback role.
See: Cost and dependency compared with satelliteWhere HF sits in a national resilience plan
National backup network for when mobile and internet services fail
That is the design case. An HF network keeps working when the towers are down, the fibre is cut and the billing systems are unreachable, because it does not use any of them. Ours is deployable as a standing national emergency network operating independently of any commercial or foreign-owned infrastructure. The work is in planning the station siting, antennas and drills, not in the radios alone.
See: Standing national emergency networkResilience for infrastructure and civil security
HF communications for remote operations with no towers or subscriptions
Remote administration, field camps, survey teams and border posts are exactly where the subscription model quietly fails. Our transceivers are compact and field-repairable, so a technician at the site can fix a fault instead of shipping the radio out and waiting weeks. There are no recurring fees and nothing an adversary or a disaster can switch off. Freedom from infrastructure is a property of HF itself, and Barrett says the same in its catalogue, so judge vendors on what happens afterwards.
Alternative to Codan or Barrett for a national HF network
The alternative is structural rather than technical. Both incumbents build good HF, and Codan publishes MTBF of 116,000 hours, MIL-STD-810G and IP68 sealing that we have not yet published equivalents for. What ours removes is the vendor-issued option code: no separate licence to enable encryption or ALE, no feature catalogue, and no export classification issued by a third country. If your tender scores published power and environmental qualification, say so early and score it honestly.
What frequency range and power do the transceivers use?
We do not publish frequency and power figures for the network product itself. The HF transceiver line behind it covers 3 to 30 MHz at 4 to 25 W depending on the platform. Barrett publishes 1.5 to 30 MHz with 10, 30, 125 or 150 W options, and Codan publishes 30 W PEP programmable in 1 W steps, so the incumbents are ahead on top-end power. If a base station role needs more than we offer, that is a conversation to have before the tender closes.
See: Coverage and power rows across all threeThe transceiver line in detail
Can a ministry extend the network itself after the first phase?
Yes, and that is the reason for the open architecture. The equipment can be modified and extended by the operator rather than only by the supplier, so a second phase does not depend on a purchase order to a foreign vendor. Compare that with a model where new features arrive as vendor-issued codes and a repair means a warranty return abroad. Build the workshop capability alongside the first phase, not after it.
Does the network carry data, or only voice?
The transceiver line runs digital modes including FT8, RTTY, PSK31 and FreeDV on the radio itself, alongside SSB, CW and AM voice, with no external computer required. We do not publish data throughput figures for the network product, and both incumbents do publish theirs, so ask for measured rates during evaluation. For most emergency traffic the requirement is short, reliable messaging rather than bandwidth.
A cyclone took out our mobile network and our disaster agency lost all communications for two days. What do we install so it does not happen again?
An HF layer that has nothing to lose. No towers to fall, no satellites to book, no subscription to lapse, which is why HF remains the fallback of choice for civil defence and contingency work. Ours is deployable as a standing national network, so it is exercised in the quiet years rather than commissioned during the emergency. Budget for antennas, siting and drills as seriously as for the radios, because that is where the network is actually built.
See: The infrastructure-independent HF networkResilience bought before the crisis
What should a government buy to connect provincial emergency operations centres without depending on a foreign satellite operator?
A standing HF network between the centres, sized around the traffic that has to move on the worst day rather than the best. Ours operates independently of any commercial or foreign-owned infrastructure, so no constellation operator, regulator or billing system sits inside your continuity plan. Where bandwidth is genuinely required, run satellite alongside it and treat HF as the layer that survives its loss. One team supplies and sustains the HF side in region.
See: National emergency network deploymentHF against satellite on cost and dependency
We were quoted separate option codes for encryption and ALE on top of the radios. Is there a supplier without that model?
Read the Codan datasheet as a procurement document and the pattern is clear: 3G ALE, AES-256, CES-128, ECCM frequency hopping and even a foreign-language interface are transceiver options enabled by vendor-issued codes. Barrett lists 2G ALE, 3G ALE, secure call and frequency hopping the same way. A national emergency network built on option codes has a foreign commercial dependency at its centre. Ours is built on open architecture and field repair, which puts that dependency inside your own signals corps. We do not publish encryption or ALE specifications, so raise those requirements with us directly.
How do we sustain a national HF network for twenty years without sending equipment to a foreign depot?
By holding the design and the repair skill yourself. Compact, field-repairable transceivers with open architecture let a national workshop stock spares, diagnose faults and rebuild boards without a returns process. Codan's published MTTR of under 30 minutes is genuinely good and still assumes the supply relationship holds for two decades and that the product line survives. Plan the workshop, the training and the spares holding in the first contract, because retrofitting sovereignty later is expensive.
See: Repair and vendor dependency comparedHow a communications programme is structured and sustained
Is HF still relevant when everyone has satellite phones and mobile data?
It is relevant precisely because everyone has them. Satellite and mobile are excellent until a constellation operator, a regulator or a billing system decides otherwise, or until the ground segment goes down with everything else. HF asks nothing of any of them, which is why it keeps reappearing in national contingency plans rather than retiring. Treat it as the layer that has to work when the assumptions behind the other layers fail.
Can the same HF network serve civil defence, the armed forces and remote government administration at once?
It can, and running one network across those users is usually cheaper and better exercised than three that each atrophy. Ours is positioned for civil defence, contingency and remote operations, and it works from the same open transceiver line as our military HF radios, so training, spares and repair skills carry across. Where the armed forces have a coalition or certified-crypto requirement, that piece needs a separate conversation. Agree who administers frequencies and drills before the first station is installed.
See: Network roles and deploymentThe shared transceiver line
HF emergency communications: questions
What are HF emergency communications?
HF emergency communications are Unstrat's Land (Land Domain) capability: Resilient high-frequency communication networks that work when everything else is down: no towers, no satellites, no subscriptions. Compact, field-repairable HF transceivers with open architecture, deployable as national emergency and contingency networks for civil defence and remote operations.
How do HF emergency communications work?
HF emergency communications deliver their effect through Resilient HF networks for civil defence, contingency and remote operations, Compact, field-repairable transceivers with open architecture and Deployable as a standing national emergency network, capabilities matched to the requirement and confirmed under briefing rather than published.
Who makes HF emergency communications?
HF emergency communications are built by The Secure Radio Manufacturer, whose focus is software-defined radios & secure communications. Unstrat represents The Secure Radio Manufacturer to government and enterprise buyers worldwide as an independent, non-aligned prime vendor.
Who uses HF emergency communications?
Government and enterprise buyers acquire HF emergency communications to address communications failure after disasters across the land domain, matched to the mission and accountable to them, not to a foreign vendor's government.
Why choose HF emergency communications over a major-power alternative?
HF emergency communications are sourced from an independent, non-aligned manufacturer, so they carry no major-power disclosure rules, upgrade-locks or political ramifications. Concretely: no towers, no satellites, no recurring fees, nothing an adversary or disaster can take down. The capability is accountable to you, not to a foreign vendor's government and its release schedule.
How are HF emergency communications procured, and where can it be exported?
A national fallback network that works when towers, satellites and subscriptions do not: HF communications with no infrastructure between the two radios. Every engagement begins with a briefing, and export eligibility is confirmed per market under briefing rather than published. Where controlled capabilities are involved, the classification and end-user-certificate chain is confirmed first. HF emergency communications are then sustained in-region by one accountable team from briefing through long-term operation.