Veto the Veto
Buying the system does not buy control.
Contracts can secure hardware. They cannot force another government to approve a transfer, release a component or keep support running. These 134 cases show the limit of a contract: the supplying government can still say no.
Cases by year
All years
Ukraine got 1,000 Patriots on paper. Just not on the field.
Ukraine is contracting about 1,000 Patriot missiles, but its minister says most will arrive in coming years.
Croatia ordered the American HIMARS. And, just to be sure, the Korean Chunmoo too.
Croatia’s 18-launcher Chunmoo programme adds a Korean route after its US HIMARS order.
There's no Chinese embargo. Just suppliers quietly saying no.
Some Chinese rare-earth firms reportedly halted US shipments, putting attention on the materials before production.
India bought the Rafale. France kept the passwords.
India’s reported search for Rafale software access shows where ownership of an aircraft can stop.
India banned 914 defence imports. Now someone has to make them locally.
India’s six indigenisation lists cover 914 items. The procurement rule comes before the production proof.
Bulgaria bought F-16s. Lockheed said, wait a few years.
Bulgaria asked Lockheed Martin to accelerate a second F-16 batch reported as at risk of a 2030 delivery.
China couldn't punish Taiwan. So it punished 10 suppliers to Taiwan.
China’s June 2026 export-control listing made Chinese inputs a permission question for ten US entities.
Washington paused Taiwan's weapons. And forgot to tell Taiwan.
Taipei said it had not been notified after US testimony described a pause in foreign military sales.
Europe blocked Myanmar for another year. Myanmar had Plans B, C and D.
The EU retained its Myanmar arms embargo and related bans through 30 April 2027.
Taiwan asked for a delivery date. Washington delivered a 'we recognise the urgency' reply.
Taiwan’s defence minister said Washington recognised the urgency of speeding delayed weapons deliveries.
Ukraine needed Patriots. Another war got into the queue.
Reuters reported that the Iran conflict could divert US PAC-3 interceptors intended for Ukraine.
Russia built the missile. The West built much of its brain.
An investigation alleges Chinese-origin electronics and suppliers are part of the supply chain for Russian Kalibr and Kh-35U missiles.
Britain found a new mine. China still owned the refinery.
UK diversification plans confront China’s processing role, the stage that turns ore into usable rare-earth material.
China couldn't stop Taiwan's US weapons deal. So it sanctioned the suppliers.
China’s December 2025 measures targeted 20 US defence companies and 10 people over Taiwan arms sales.
Ukraine needed a coalition cheque. Slovakia kept its wallet shut.
Slovakia’s prime minister said the country would not provide further funding for Ukraine’s military needs.
NATO invited bids. A corruption inquiry uninvited two suppliers.
Reporting says NSPA’s suspension of Elbit and Orion barred new tenders and put some contracts on hold.
Switzerland loosened its export rules. The permission slip stayed.
Swiss parliament agreed to ease arms-export and re-export rules while retaining the licensing power at the centre of the dispute.
Saudi Arabia can buy F-35s. Israel still gets the better ones.
Reuters reported that planned Saudi F-35s would lack some advanced features available to Israel. The sale still required a qualitative-military-edge review and congressional approval, so the report does not establish a final configuration or delivery.
Taiwan ordered 66 F-16Vs. The delivery year flew past.
Taiwan said production-line relocations and disruptions pushed the expected delivery of all 66 F-16Vs beyond the original end-2026 plan. Torpedoes and glide bombs also slipped, while HIMARS deliveries were ahead of schedule.
Europe asked for rare earths. China asked for paperwork.
China’s October 2025 licensing rules reached rare-earth technology and battery-chain machinery. ECFR said fewer than 15% of European rare-earth licence requests had cleared by early September.
Japan moved production. China's rare-earth rules followed it.
China’s 9 October 2025 rare-earth controls added downstream licensing exposure for foreign producers using Chinese material or equipment. Japanese production was put at risk, but no shutdown, named programme or refused shipment is established.
Germany kept selling Israel arms. Just not for Gaza.
Germany said on 8 August 2025 that it would not approve military equipment that could be used in Gaza, then moved toward a conditional resumption in November. The record does not establish a total embargo or battlefield effect.
America and China made peace over magnets. Military magnets were excluded.
The June 2025 US-China trade truce left specialized rare-earth magnets for fighter jets and missiles outside its licence fast track. The evidence shows an unresolved supply dependency, not a named weapon failure or production stoppage.
Peru paid for three helicopter overhauls. The helicopters kept waiting.
Three Peruvian Mi-171 helicopters missed an October 2024 overhaul deadline after two extensions. Peru rejected a further 151-day request and imposed an approximately $1.9 million penalty, while return to service remained unreported.
Europe wanted defence factories. China controlled the ingredients.
China’s 4 April 2025 controls on seven medium and heavy rare earths added export permission to supply chains used by European aerospace and defence industries. Delays were reported, but no named programme or production stoppage is established.
Ukraine kept the satellite. America changed the password.
The United States disabled Ukraine’s access to Maxar imagery through a government programme during the March 2025 assistance pause. The evidence shows an interruption of one route, not a satellite or intelligence blackout.
Washington dimmed Ukraine's battlefield picture. Then switched it back.
The United States paused intelligence sharing with Ukraine on 5 March 2025 after a political rupture, then restored it on 11 March after talks in Saudi Arabia. Reporting disagreed over whether the cut was total or partial, and does not quantify its operational effect.
Trump and Zelensky argued. Ukraine's supply line paid.
The Trump administration paused and reviewed US military aid to Ukraine on 3 March 2025 after a rupture with Kyiv. The announcement disrupted expected deliveries, but the sources did not establish the scope, duration or an immediate battlefield effect.
India built the Tejas. America delivered the engine late.
GE engine deliveries delayed Tejas Mk1A handovers by nearly 12 months. HAL expected 16 to 24 aircraft in the financial year beginning April 2025, while the Indian Air Force had 31 fighter squadrons against a target of 42. No squadron grounding is established.
Serbia escaped Russian dependence. And found several new dependencies.
Serbia is cancelling or postponing Russian weapons contracts while searching for supply and maintenance routes elsewhere.
Everyone bought Chinese drone parts. Then China found the export switch.
China’s reported controls on batteries, motors and flight controllers expose the gap between owning a drone and controlling its parts supply.
Australia ordered nuclear submarines. Its old fleet now has to live forever.
Australia planned to extend its Collins-class submarines while developing the AUKUS nuclear-powered fleet. The listed ANAO page is a 2009 sustainment audit, so the case’s 2024 cost, availability and capability-gap claims remain unverified.
Washington sanctioned Sudan's arms buyer. Sudan kept buying.
US sanctions on Sudan’s defence-industries director target a weapons-procurement role, but the evidence does not show an industrial shutdown.
Germany called it a pause. Israel's approvals desk called it no.
Germany put new approvals for weapons of war to Israel on hold in September 2024 while legal challenges were addressed. The evidence shows an approvals constraint, not a total export cutoff or measured loss of Israeli capability.
Britain suspended 30 Israel licences. The other 320 kept moving.
Britain suspended 30 of roughly 350 arms export licences to Israel on 2 September 2024. The government cited a serious international-humanitarian-law risk, while saying the measure was not an embargo and would not materially affect Israel’s security.
America built a $100 million drone base. Niger asked it to leave.
Niger’s junta ordered US forces out after the 2023 coup. The United States left Air Base 101 on 7 July 2024 and completed its withdrawal from Air Base 201 on 5 August, removing a major intelligence site without a quantified regional coverage loss.
Washington let Ukraine strike near Kharkiv. ATACMS stayed home.
The United States allowed Ukraine to use certain US weapons for counter-fire near Kharkiv in May 2024, while keeping ATACMS and other long-range strikes inside Russia prohibited. The change was conditional, not general.
Europe found money for Ukraine. Hungary found the brake.
Hungary blocked EU measures worth about €6.5 billion in military aid to Ukraine in May 2024, according to Reuters. The figure covered reimbursement and support decisions, not one cash payment, and the evidence does not show that all transfers stopped.
Washington stopped one bomb shipment. Israel saw the switch.
The United States paused one shipment of 1,800 2,000-pound bombs and 1,700 500-pound bombs in May 2024 over concern about their possible use in Rafah. Wider US support continued, and the later operational effect is not established.
Serbia needed new fighters. Russian sanctions sold it Rafales.
Serbia moved towards French Rafales after Aleksandar Vučić said sanctions and logistics isolation had made Russian combat-aircraft acquisitions difficult. In August 2024, Serbia signed for 12 Rafales, but the sources do not prove sanctions were the sole cause.
Ecuador wanted $200 million in US arms. Ukraine killed the swap.
Ecuador cancelled a proposed exchange of outdated Soviet weapons for $200 million in U.S. arms after President Daniel Noboa objected to the equipment being sent to Ukraine. Russia had criticised the plan, but Reuters does not establish that retaliation caused the decision.
Avdiivka ran out of ammunition. Washington was still debating it.
Ukrainian forces withdrew from Avdiivka on 17 February 2024 after months of fighting and an ammunition shortage linked by US and Ukrainian officials to stalled US aid. The sources do not assign the retreat a single cause.
Dutch F-35 parts were heading to Israel. A court gave them seven days.
A Dutch appeals court ordered the Netherlands to stop exporting US-owned F-35 parts to Israel within seven days on 12 February 2024. The order closed one distribution route, but no fleet-wide readiness effect is established.
Colombia owned Russian helicopters. The banking system grounded them.
Colombia’s Russian Mi-17 fleet ran into a sanctions-linked payment barrier when a repair contractor could not receive payment through SWIFT, Defense Express reported. It gave nine of about 20 helicopters as flight-capable, but no independent readiness measure or final repair outcome is documented.
Armenia paid Russia $400 million. Russia kept the weapons.
Armenian officials said Russia had not supplied weapons covered by paid contracts worth about $400 million. The weapon types were not disclosed, Russia had not publicly responded in the retrieved reporting, and the talks had not produced a recorded settlement.
Cyprus owned Russian helicopters. The spare-parts route made them a liability.
Cyprus sold its 11 surviving Russian Mi-35P gunships to Serbia after sanctions disrupted the fleet’s Russian maintenance and spare-parts route, according to specialist reporting. Reuters confirms the 2021 agreement and 2023 acquisition; the final readiness effect remains unmeasured.
Turkey joined a British fighter programme. Germany kept a veto.
Turkey’s proposed 40-jet Eurofighter purchase faced German opposition in 2023 because the aircraft are made by a four-country consortium. Germany later approved delivery in 2025, but Britain said final negotiations were still continuing.
Slovakia stopped donating arms. Its arms factories kept selling them.
Slovakia halted state military supplies to Ukraine after Robert Fico’s government took office in October 2023, while allowing commercial sales. A June 2024 criminal complaint over earlier transfers remained an allegation, not a court finding.
Russia brought the peacekeepers. Azerbaijan brought the outcome.
Azerbaijan took control of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023 despite Russian peacekeepers. Armenia’s prime minister said the Russian partnership was not enough to ensure security, but the sources do not establish the contingent’s orders, capacity or operational effect.
Vietnam paid Russia in oil. Sanctions rerouted the money.
AP reported that Vietnam used profits from a Siberian joint oil venture to repay credit for Russian fighter jets, tanks and ships. A 2023 planning document was disputed, while a later document described implementation. The article does not claim US sanctions were imposed.
India received three S-400s. The other two stayed in Russia.
India had received three of five S-400 systems when Russia said in August 2023 that the $5.4 billion order would meet its end-2024 schedule. The remaining two systems still depended on the Russian delivery chain.
Bulgaria sent its MiG engines abroad to keep its MiGs flying.
Bulgaria signed a €9.5 million Polish contract on 9 August 2023 to overhaul six MiG-29 engines. The defence ministry said the work would support airworthiness until F-16 Block 70 aircraft became operational. Fleet readiness and patrol-hour gains remain unreported.
Niger changed governments. France changed its security cheque.
After Niger’s July 2023 coup, the EU suspended budget support and security cooperation, France halted development aid, and Washington warned that major assistance was in jeopardy. Humanitarian deliveries and programme-by-programme effects remained separate questions.
Saudi Arabia wanted more Eurofighters. Germany owned one signature.
Germany blocked approval for additional Saudi Eurofighters in July 2023, citing the political context of Yemen and its arms policy. Berlin was prepared not to oppose further deliveries in January 2024, but no completed follow-on contract is established here.
America sanctioned Myanmar's defence ministry. Its banks got a notice period.
OFAC designated Myanmar’s defence ministry and two state banks on 21 June 2023, while allowing a wind-down of transactions involving the banks. The record does not identify a halted defence purchase.
Thailand asked for F-35s. Washington said it was not ready.
The United States declined Thailand’s F-35 request in May 2023 over training and technical requirements. Thailand later selected Saab’s Gripen E/F in 2025, but the selection was not yet a signed contract when announced.
Hungary blocked one EU cheque. Ukraine still needed the shells.
Hungary withheld approval for the next European Peace Facility military-support tranche for Ukraine on 16 May 2023. The decision delayed one EU funding channel, not every European or bilateral transfer.
India ordered Russian S-400s. Russia's war joined the delivery schedule.
India’s Air Force told a parliamentary committee that Russia could not make a major defence delivery because of the Ukraine war. Reuters also reported a near-one-third cut in projected modernisation capital spending, but did not identify the missed system.
Burkina Faso gave 400 French troops 30 days to leave.
Burkina Faso ended the accord that allowed French troops to fight insurgents on its territory, and about 400 French special forces withdrew in February 2023. The reporting does not identify a complete replacement or quantify the security effect.
Poland owned the Leopard 2s. Germany owned the export permission.
Poland sought German approval to re-export Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine in January 2023. German end-use rules made Berlin the permission point, although later reporting shows that Germany agreed to the transfer.
Taiwan had a $19 billion weapons backlog. Ukraine could make it worse.
The January 2023 analysis described Taiwan’s nearly $19 billion arms backlog and traced the main causes to US industrial limits and Foreign Military Sales delays, not principally to aid for Ukraine. It warned that future competition for scarce capacity would still grow.
Argentina removed British parts from Gripen. The price removed Gripen.
Argentina’s Gripen option was reported to require replacement of British content before export. Saab found the change technically possible, but the airframe work, integration and testing made the aircraft too expensive for Argentina.
South Korea had the shells. It kept them out of Ukraine.
President Yoon Suk-yeol said on 28 October 2022 that South Korea had supplied humanitarian and non-lethal support but no lethal weapons to Ukraine. The reports support a policy restriction, not a claim that all aid was refused.
Ukraine asked Israel for air defence. Israel offered an alarm.
Israel declined Ukraine’s request for air-defence interceptors in October 2022 while offering help with civilian warning systems. The source names the requested systems but does not show whether the warning offer was deployed or what it achieved.
Ukraine advanced. Starlink's coverage did not.
Reuters reported that Starlink coverage was cut during Ukraine’s September 2022 Kherson counteroffensive, disrupting drones and artillery targeting. Ukrainian sources said an attempted encirclement near Beryslav failed; SpaceX disputed the investigation.
Armenia had an alliance. Nagorno-Karabakh was outside the small print.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said the CSTO had not fulfilled its objectives for Armenia in 2021 and 2022 and that participation was frozen “in practical terms”. Reuters reported no formal exit or closure of Russia’s base.
Ukraine had the drones. Musk controlled where they could fly.
Elon Musk said SpaceX refused to activate Starlink coverage to Sevastopol for a planned Ukrainian naval-drone attack in 2022. The reports identify the service refusal and his escalation concern, but not the complete operational outcome.
Slovakia retired its MiGs. The American replacements had not arrived.
Slovakia grounded its MiG-29 fleet in August 2022 amid spare-parts and sustainment problems. Poland and the Czech Republic provided air-policing cover while delayed US F-16 replacements were due to arrive in 2024.
Mali replaced France with Russia. The violence stayed.
Reuters reported that violent deaths in Mali more than doubled to nearly 5,000 in 2022 as more than 2,000 French troops left and Mali’s army teamed up with Wagner. The sequence documents deterioration, not sole causation.
The Philippines ordered Russian helicopters. American sanctions joined the deal.
The Philippines cancelled its 16-helicopter Russian Mi-17 contract after the Ukraine invasion made US sanctions a stated risk. Manila sought to recover a substantial down payment and explored US Chinooks, but the payment’s final fate and replacement contract remain unclear.
Spain had guns for Ukraine. Switzerland still had the final yes.
Reuters reported that Spain sought to send two Swiss-origin 35-millimetre anti-aircraft guns to Ukraine, and that Switzerland rejected the request. The supplied case date conflicts with that account, and the later outcome is unknown.
Denmark offered Ukraine 22 vehicles. Switzerland vetoed the destination.
Switzerland rejected Denmark’s request to send 22 Swiss-made Piranha III armoured vehicles to Ukraine. The decision shows how a re-export condition can survive delivery, but the sources do not establish a later outcome or operational effect.
Ukraine found missiles in Germany. Israel held the permission.
Israel rejected a US request to approve Germany’s transfer of Israeli-licensed Spike missiles to Ukraine in May 2022. The reporting identifies the licence condition and stated Syria-related concern, but not the quantity or operational effect.
Argentina bought fighters. Britain kept the ejection seats.
Argentina received five French Super Étendard Modernisé jets in 2019, but Air Data News reported in 2022 that British-made ejection-seat pyrotechnics remained unavailable under an embargo. The aircraft arrived; the safety-critical support chain did not.
Germany had Gepard guns. Switzerland held the ammunition.
Switzerland rejected Germany’s requests to re-export Swiss-origin ammunition for Ukraine, including 35 mm Gepard rounds. The refusal closed one supply route, but the sources do not show that any vehicle stopped operating or quantify the wider effect.
Russia's missiles were sanctioned. Western chips kept arriving.
RUSI examined 27 Russian military systems and found at least 450 kinds of foreign-made components, including export-controlled parts. Substitution and covert procurement continued after 2022, so the evidence shows dependency under pressure, not total denial.
Russia kept the missile factories. The West targeted their accuracy.
US export controls constrained Russia’s access to machine tools, semiconductors and industrial inputs. The State Department reports shortages, cannibalisation and stalled production, but the retrieved assessment does not quantify the output loss or prove a complete shutdown.
China sanctioned Lockheed and Raytheon. Nobody could find the punishment.
China’s sanctions target US defence firms linked to Taiwan arms sales, showing how a supplier can become a point of political control.
Estonia had howitzers for Ukraine. Germany had the export key.
Germany refused permission for Estonia to send German-origin D-30 howitzers to Ukraine in January 2022. The decision blocked a transfer route, but the sources do not establish the number of guns, a later German outcome or an operational loss.
Pakistan bought a Turkish helicopter. America kept the engine licence.
Pakistan cancelled its planned 30-helicopter T129 project after a US export licence for the LHTEC T800-4A engine was not granted, Janes reported. Pakistan then pursued China’s Z-10ME; no replacement delivery is established.
Indonesia's Su-35 deal survived every announcement. Then definitions killed it.
Indonesia’s 2018 contract announcement and 2021 account of an unsigned deal conflict. Jakarta’s air-force chief said it had abandoned the Su-35 plan; Russia’s ambassador still called it pending in 2025.
The UAE wanted F-35s. Washington wanted control over how they flew.
The UAE suspended talks over a reported $23 billion package for 50 F-35s, up to 18 armed drones and munitions. Abu Dhabi cited operating conditions and cost, while Washington insisted on end-use and technology safeguards.
Argentina shortlisted fighters. Britain kept appearing inside them.
British-origin content and UK export policy narrowed Argentina’s fighter choices, including the FA-50 option reported in 2021. The sources establish a procurement barrier and an unresolved shortlist, not a signed contract or formal denial.
Australia cancelled 12 French submarines. Then bought a longer wait.
Australia ended its planned twelve-boat French Attack-class programme on 16 September 2021 and announced AUKUS instead. The alliance shift reset the submarine pathway while nuclear technology, industrial capacity and delivery timing remained to be developed.
America moved Patriot and THAAD. Saudi threats stayed.
The United States removed Patriot batteries and a THAAD unit from Prince Sultan Air Base in September 2021 while Houthi attacks continued. AP satellite reporting shows a changed US deployment, not the disappearance of Saudi air defence or proof that a specific strike followed from the move.
Afghanistan owned the air force. America owned its support system.
SIGAR found that the withdrawal of US forces and contractors was the most important near-term factor in the ANDSF’s collapse. Maintenance, aircraft availability, air support and logistics depended on an external system the Afghan force could not quickly replace.
The Afghan Air Force had aircraft. Its maintainers had tickets home.
The Afghan Air Force owned aircraft but relied heavily on foreign contractors to maintain them. A January 2021 assessment warned that the fleet might remain combat-effective for only a few months after contracted maintainers withdrew.
Rockets hit Balad. Iraq's F-16 technicians left first.
Lockheed Martin relocated its Iraq-based F-16 maintenance team from Balad on 10 May 2021 after rocket attacks. Remote support was planned, but no aircraft count, duration or readiness effect was reported.
Canada spotted its camera in another war. Turkey lost the camera.
Canada cancelled suspended export permits to Türkiye in April 2021 after finding credible evidence that Canadian sensors on Turkish UAVs had been used in Nagorno-Karabakh. The decision changed sourcing, but did not ban all Turkish drones or establish a quantified production loss.
Turkey built the Altay tank. Germany kept the engine.
German export restrictions blocked the intended MTU engine and RENK transmission for Turkey’s Altay tank. BMC then arranged a South Korean powerpack, but integration and testing still stood between the agreement and serial service.
Armenia had a defence guarantee. Nagorno-Karabakh did not.
Armenia belonged to the CSTO, but the alliance’s collective-defence commitments did not officially extend to Nagorno-Karabakh, internationally recognised as Azerbaijani territory. Russia brokered the ceasefire and deployed peacekeepers without turning the 2020 war into a CSTO combat intervention.
Turkey bought the S-400. America removed its F-35 seat.
The first S-400 components arrived in July 2019. Washington began removing Turkey from the fighter programme it had helped build.
Saudi agents killed Khashoggi. Germany's arms desk answered.
Berlin’s November 2018 moratorium stopped new licences and was extended six months in March 2019.
South Sudan found a seller. The UN still had to approve the buyer.
Resolution 2428 made covered arms transfers unlawful without an applicable exemption from 13 July 2018 to 31 May 2019.
France sold Rafales to Egypt. America held the missile.
France could sell the aircraft, but Washington would not clear a US component in the SCALP missile package, French ministers said in 2018.
Canada doubted the helicopter mission. Duterte cancelled the helicopters.
Canada reviewed the $233 million Bell 412 agreement after a dispute over end use. The Philippine president then ordered its cancellation.
Europe embargoed Venezuela. Its arms market shrank.
The EU’s 13 November 2017 measures covered arms and equipment that might be used for internal repression, surveillance equipment and related finance.
The Philippines ordered 26,000 rifles. One US senator stopped them.
The State Department halted the proposed Philippine police sale in 2016 after Senator Ben Cardin said he would oppose it.
Bahrain's F-16s waited for a new US president.
The Obama administration pulled back a proposed sale over rights concerns. The Trump administration reopened a $4.867 billion package for 19 fighters.
Pakistan could buy the F-16s. Congress made them $430 million dearer.
Congress blocked US financing for the 2016 package, leaving Pakistan with the full cost of aircraft the administration still wanted to sell.
Nigeria wanted Super Tucanos for Boko Haram. Washington inspected Nigeria first.
A rights-based US hold delayed the A-29 sale. A new administration cleared the 12-aircraft package in 2017.
Argentina went fighter shopping. Britain was inside every aircraft.
The reported Kfir and Gripen difficulties showed how British-origin parts and US engines could shape a deal whose advertised supplier was elsewhere.
Russia froze Iran's S-300s for five years. Then thawed the deal.
The 2007 contract was suspended in 2010 and reinstated in 2015. The reviewed reporting does not document a technology transfer or a specific shipment.
The UN did not embargo Yemen. It embargoed people in Yemen.
Resolution 2216 barred direct and indirect transfers to named and committee-designated individuals and entities from April 2015.
Ukraine asked America for weapons. America sent equipment without weapons.
US aid included body armour, vehicles and counter-mortar radars, while the Obama administration declined lethal assistance until policy changed in 2017.
France built Russia two warships. Then refused delivery.
The Mistrals were completed at Saint-Nazaire, but Paris cancelled delivery in 2015 and agreed to reimburse Moscow.
Europe started closing Russia's defence supply eight years before the invasion.
EU measures from July 2014 barred arms, military services and certain dual-use transfers. The regime widened after the full-scale invasion.
Ukraine cut 3,000 defence links to Russia. Both sides lost parts.
Kyiv’s 2014 ban on military-industrial cooperation with Russia hit a Soviet-era production web, not one single weapons contract.
The UN changed CAR's arms rule from 'no' to 'notify'.
The UN embargo began as a prohibition with exemptions, then shifted to a notification regime for government imports in 2018.
Egypt's coup put F-16s, Apaches and tank kits in an American waiting room.
The United States suspended selected deliveries in October 2013. It released them again in 2015 while recasting future military financing.
Europe promised to stop Egypt's repression equipment. It left the arms door open.
EU foreign ministers agreed to suspend export licences for equipment usable in internal repression after the August 2013 violence.
Belarus cracked down. Europe closed the arms counter.
The EU added an arms embargo to restrictive measures in June 2011, tying the decision to post-election repression and political prisoners.
Europe embargoed Syria. Then let the embargo expire.
The 2011 embargo was modified in 2013 before it expired. The legal changes matter more than a blanket story about Europe simply stopping arms.
Libya could buy arms. First a UN committee had to agree.
Resolution 1970 barred arms transfers in 2011 while allowing committee-approved exemptions. The regime changed as Libya’s conflict changed.
Brazil built the Super Tucano. America controlled the pieces.
Brazilian officials cited US technology in the proposed Embraer sale; Venezuela then bought Chinese K-8 trainers.
Eritrea's embargo blocked guns, trainers and money.
Resolution 1907 barred arms, military assistance and finance in 2009. The Security Council ended the measure in 2018.
Guinea's massacre closed the US and EU arms doors. Differently.
ECOWAS and the EU acted after security forces killed protesters in Conakry. Their measures were related but not identical.
Georgia bought Israeli weapons. Russia reportedly influenced the supply.
The reported 2008 freeze concerned future transfers, not a claim that Israel disarmed Georgia or that every prior sale was reversed.
North Korea's embargo started with tanks. Then kept growing.
UN restrictions tightened in 2006, 2009 and 2016, expanding from major systems to small arms and wider military support.
Venezuela chose a Brazilian aircraft. American parts vetoed the choice.
Embraer’s proposed Super Tucano deal foundered because US-origin components required Washington’s approval.
Venezuela owned the F-16s. America owned the spare parts.
US restrictions did not erase the F-16 fleet, but they narrowed its support route as Venezuela sought Russian and Chinese alternatives.
Spain offered Venezuela aircraft. America hid a veto inside them.
A proposed Spanish sale of C-295 transport aircraft was reportedly blocked because the aircraft contained US-origin technology.
Europe shut Uzbekistan's arms door after Andijan. Then slowly reopened it.
The EU embargo followed the 2005 killings in Andijan and was lifted in 2009 after a phased loosening of other sanctions.
Israel sold China Harpy drones. America stopped the upgrade.
US pressure ended work on the Israeli-made drones in 2005, straining a relationship built around an earlier sale.
Nepal's king seized power. The West turned off military aid.
India, the United States and the United Kingdom cut or reviewed assistance after King Gyanendra seized power in February 2005.
Cote d'Ivoire was embargoed. Government exceptions remained.
Resolution 1572 barred arms transfers in 2004 but allowed exemptions, including equipment for Ivorian forces approved in advance.
Europe embargoed Zimbabwe. It blocked more than weapons.
The 2002 measures were broader than a ban on shipments. They also covered technical assistance, brokering and related financing.
Liberia's arms embargo shrank before it disappeared.
The UN first shut the arms route in 2003, then eased it for the government and security-sector reform before ending it in 2016.
The Taliban ban started with people. The UN expanded it to territory.
Resolution 1333 tightened the 2000 restriction by covering arms supply to Taliban-controlled territory as well as designated people.
Indonesia owned 233 fighters. America grounded half without touching them.
In December 2001, Indonesian commanders said the US embargo had left only 40 to 50 percent of the fighter fleet operational.
Israel built China an airborne radar. America stopped the handover.
The Phalcon deal was cancelled in 2000 after Washington objected, leaving Israel to compensate China for the failed sale.
Eritrea and Ethiopia went to war. The UN blocked both shopping lists.
Resolution 1298 barred arms, training and military finance to both belligerents in May 2000. The Council lifted it one year later.
Ethiopia got an arms embargo. Eritrea had the same address.
Resolution 1298 treated the two belligerents as recipients of the same arms, training and finance ban from May 2000 to May 2001.
Britain did not seize Zimbabwe's Hawk jets. It starved them of parts.
The UK removed Zimbabwe from all open individual licences for military-list and dual-use goods on 12 May 2000.