Turkey wanted 40 Eurofighters. Germany had to say yes.

Turkey could ask Britain and Spain for 40 Eurofighter Typhoons. It could not get to the sale without Germany.

On 16 November 2023, Turkish Defence Minister Yasar Guler told a parliamentary hearing that Ankara was discussing the aircraft with Britain and Spain. Reuters reported that Germany objected to the idea. Guler said, “Now the UK and Spain are making efforts to convince Germany,” and added that Turkey was not talking to Berlin at that point. His qualification was important. Turkey was discussing a purchase, not announcing one.

The proposed aircraft were built by a four-country consortium: Germany, Britain, Italy and Spain. That arrangement gave Germany a say even though the Turkish talks described in the report were with Britain and Spain. Industrial participation widened the production base, but it also widened the number of governments able to affect an export.

The November report did not establish a price, a contract, an export licence, a delivery timetable or a final decision. It also did not establish that Turkey had lost an operational capability. The defensible account is narrower. A consortium member opposed the prospective sale, and two other members were trying to change that position.

That is a real procurement constraint, not a completed veto. A government can have a requirement, a willing industrial supplier and several supportive partners, yet still be waiting for the partner whose approval is necessary. The aircraft remain a proposed capability until those political and legal steps are complete.

The issue sat alongside another Turkish fighter requirement. Reuters noted that Ankara had also sought US F-16s and that the order had been delayed. That does not make the Eurofighter proposal a substitute for the F-16 request, and the sources do not measure the effect of either delay on Turkey’s force. It does show why the timing of a prospective fighter purchase mattered to Ankara.

The case changed after the date attached to this record. In November 2024, Reuters reported that Germany had mandated its Temporary Sales Authority to work on a possible Eurofighter sale, while a Turkish defence ministry source warned that this did not mean the process was concluded. The same report said technical work continued and described the aircraft as an alternative for the Turkish air force’s operational needs. Germany had moved from objection to process, but the words “possible sale” still mattered.

In July 2025, Reuters reported that Britain and Turkey had signed a preliminary agreement allowing Ankara to operate the jets and that Germany had approved delivery of 40 aircraft. A German government spokesperson confirmed that its defence ministry had sent written confirmation of export approval. Britain said negotiations over the ultimate sale would continue. Turkish Defence Minister Guler called the agreements one step closer to a comprehensive deal, not the delivery of an aircraft.

The 2025 report also described different options for the composition of the planned acquisition, even though the headline quantity remained 40. That is another reason not to write the case as a settled fleet order. The number attached to the proposal was stable enough to report, while the final commercial and technical arrangement was still being negotiated.

The later development does not erase the 2023 constraint. It clarifies its limits. Germany’s objection was not an irreversible prohibition, and the original report did not justify saying that Turkey would never receive Eurofighters. It showed that the consortium’s structure gave one partner leverage over a proposed sale. That leverage was eventually used differently.

The consortium arrangement also explains why the 2023 account named Britain and Spain but still centred on Germany. BAE Systems represented Britain, Airbus represented Germany and Spain, and Leonardo represented Italy in the industrial group described in the later Reuters reporting. The commercial companies could work on a proposal, but the national governments retained the export decisions that mattered. A manufacturer’s willingness to sell was not the same as a government’s permission to export.