Slovakia grounded its MiG-29s before its F-16s arrived.
Slovakia ended use of its Soviet-made MiG-29 fleet in late August 2022 as reliability and sustainment problems mounted. Poland and the Czech Republic then provided air-policing cover while delivery of Slovakia’s US F-16 replacements was delayed to 2024.

The MiG-29s were still Slovakia’s fighters on paper. They were not a dependable answer to the next air-policing call.
The Associated Press account behind this case, dated 27 August 2022, reported that Slovakia had grounded its MiG-29 fleet amid reliability and sustainment concerns. Independent NATO reporting confirms the transition. Poland and the Czech Republic pledged fighter aircraft that could react to threats over Slovak airspace from September 2022, while Slovakia replaced its legacy Soviet-made fleet with US F-16s.
The timing created a capability gap between retirement and replacement. Slovakia had ordered 14 F-16 Block 70/72 aircraft from the United States in 2018, but delivery was delayed. PBS, reporting on the same transition, said the first aircraft were pushed back to early 2024. NATO’s Allied Air Command described the allied arrangement as necessary because Slovakia was replacing the MiG-29s with F-16s.
The specific problem was sustainment. PBS reported that the MiGs were grounded because Slovakia lacked spare parts and the expertise to maintain them after Russian technicians returned home. The report identifies a maintenance and support failure. It does not say that every reliability problem came from one Russian decision, or that the aircraft were permanently beyond repair.
Slovakia therefore moved from owning a fighter fleet to relying on allies for a defined mission. NATO’s 2022 account said Polish and Czech aircraft would provide air-policing capability from 1 September and could identify unknown tracks and protect the integrity of Slovak airspace. A later NATO account said the aircraft would be able to react at a moment’s notice from their home bases. The arrangement was a real operating commitment, but the sources do not provide sortie numbers, response-time comparisons, cost or a test of its performance against a particular incident.
This is more precise than saying that Slovakia had no air force. Air policing is a specific role, and allied fighters filled it during the transition. Slovakia still had aircraft and a replacement programme. The documented change was who supplied the alert and response function while the national fleet was being replaced.
The episode also separates procurement from sustainment. Slovakia’s original decision to buy F-16s had already been made. The immediate constraint came from the old fleet’s availability and the delayed arrival of its successor. A contract for a replacement does not protect a country from a readiness gap if the outgoing aircraft become unreliable before the new ones are delivered.
The Russian connection must be described with equal care. The MiG-29 was Soviet-designed and depended on a support ecosystem associated with Russia. The sources report a shortage of parts and expertise after Russian technicians returned home, and the case record identifies geopolitical rupture as part of the mechanism. They do not establish a complete account of the maintenance relationship, a formal Russian export refusal or the precise reason for each grounded aircraft.
AI-generated representative image.
