Attacks on critical infrastructure: Argentina
Argentina's power, water and transport systems stretch across a large country and depend on long-distance grids and remote generation, gas processing and pipelines. Disrupting them carries national consequence, and the systems that run them are exposed from the network, the ground and increasingly the air.
Long-reach systems with little margin
The exposure is structural: transmission runs for great distances from generation to load, and the control of substations, gas plants and pumping stations depends on supervisory systems often installed before deliberate attack was a design concern. Infrastructure hardening reduces the attack surface of those control systems, so an intruder cannot force a shutdown, disrupt a supply or defeat a safety interlock. Because a failure at one node can propagate across regions, hardening the control layer protects continuity where the margin is thinnest.
Where cyber intrusion meets the drone threat
An adversary does not announce their route, so the defence must watch more than one at once. Defensive cybersecurity provides continuous monitoring and incident response around the control networks that run generation and distribution, catching an intrusion before it reaches an operational effect, while Counter-UAS addresses the drone threat to exposed physical plant such as substations, gas facilities and switchyards. All three come from independent, non-aligned makers, so the defence of essential services is accountable to the national operator, with localisation arrangements scoped per programme and subject to export controls and end-use approvals.
How engagement works in Argentina
Unstrat engages Argentina as an independent, non-aligned prime vendor: one accountable team, end-use certified, sustained in-region rather than a distribution arrangement. A programme typically begins with an assessment of the highest-consequence sites, hardens their control systems and defends the surrounding networks, then broadens into a resilient posture the operators run themselves. The non-aligned position matters because the defence of a country's essential services should answer to its own institutions alone.
Defending long-reach systems where the margin is thinnest
An infrastructure engagement begins with a briefing that identifies where disruption would carry the greatest national consequence across Argentina's large-country power, water and transport systems: the long transmission runs, remote generation, gas processing and pipelines that leave little margin. Export-control and end-use confirmation is settled before any representation, so the hardening and monitoring proposed can lawfully be delivered and sustained. Capability is matched to real conditions: control-system hardening fitted to supervisory equipment installed before deliberate attack was a design concern, defensive monitoring tuned to the networks running generation and distribution, and counter-drone cover placed over exposed substations, gas facilities and switchyards. Sustainment is phased in-region, from an assessment of the top sites toward a resilient posture the operators run themselves, with localisation arrangements scoped per programme, subject to export controls and end-use approvals. One accountable channel keeps the defence of essential services, and the continuity it protects, with Argentina's own institutions.
Relevant capability
Critical infrastructure resilience
Capability page →
Monitoring and incident response
Capability page →
Layered defence against the drone threat
Capability page →Adjacent priorities in Argentina
Ministries, registries and national databases are under continuous attack from criminal and state-linked actors. Around-the-clock defensive operations, authorised red-teaming and architectures for disconnected environments protect the systems a state runs on, accountable to your government, not a foreign one.
Problem pageCheap unmanned aircraft now threaten airports, energy sites, borders and public events in every region. Layered counter-UAS, combining detection radar tuned to small slow targets, passive sensing and defeat systems, is the affordable answer recent conflicts demand.
Problem pageTapping, bunkering and sabotage of oil infrastructure drain national revenue and cause environmental damage. Persistent overhead surveillance detects illegal connections and vessel movements, while control-system hardening protects the pipeline network itself.
Problem pageRelevant solutions
Power, water, transport and port systems assessed, hardened and watched continuously, by a team with no foreign government to report the findings to.
Solution page →Layered defence against hostile unmanned aircraft: detection, tracking and defeat priced for the mass threat rather than a missile economy that empties the magazine first.
Solution page →Argentina: security context
Argentina's long Atlantic frontage frames its priorities: maritime domain awareness across the South Atlantic, protection of its exclusive economic zone and fisheries, surveillance of extensive borders, and security of critical infrastructure. It is an environment where economic assets at sea and frontier awareness are closely linked.
An accountable single-channel engagement gives Argentina a coherent counterpart for those priorities: South Atlantic maritime domain awareness, EEZ and fisheries protection, border surveillance and infrastructure security. A defence ministry gains end-use certified equipment, disciplined export-control handling and localisation arrangements scoped per programme rather than promised in advance.
About this challenge
Power grids, water systems and transport networks face both physical and cyber attack. Hardening the control systems behind them, defending the networks around them and countering the drone threat above them keeps essential services running under pressure.
Frequently asked questions
How does this fit Argentina's long-distance grid and gas systems?
Long transmission runs and remote generation and gas control depend on supervisory systems with little margin for disruption, so hardening the control layer and defending the surrounding networks protects continuity where a failure could cascade. Counter-drone cover protects exposed physical plant. We would be glad to brief your team on prioritising the highest-consequence sites first.
Does it address both cyber and physical threats?
Yes. Defensive cybersecurity monitors the control networks continuously so an intrusion is caught before it reaches an operational effect, while Counter-UAS covers the drone threat to substations, gas facilities and switchyards. Those are the two paths an adversary is most likely to take.
Who controls the security of these systems once deployed?
The national operator. The capabilities come from independent, non-aligned makers, so the defence of essential services is accountable domestically, with localisation arrangements scoped per programme and subject to export controls and end-use approvals.