Attacks on critical infrastructure: Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan's power, water and gas systems underpin daily life for a large population concentrated in valleys and cities, and they face both physical and cyber attack. The control systems behind them were built for reliability rather than for adversaries who now arrive from several directions at once.
The systems a country cannot function without
Power generation, water supply and gas processing are interdependent in Uzbekistan, and the supervisory control systems that run them often predate the current threat. An adversary can strike through a cyber intrusion into supervisory control, a physical or drone attack on the plant, or the cascade that follows when one utility fails. Infrastructure hardening reduces the attack surface of those control systems so an intruder cannot force a shutdown or defeat a safety interlock, while defensive cybersecurity provides continuous monitoring around them.
Water, population and coupled dependence
What sharpens the risk in Uzbekistan is the coupling of water and energy for a densely settled population in an arid region, where water management and power depend on the same control networks an attacker would target, so a single well-placed intrusion can threaten essential services far beyond one site. Counter-UAS addresses the drone threat to physical plant. Because the hardening, cyber defence and counter-UAS all come from independent, non-aligned makers, the protection is accountable to the national operator with no foreign disclosure over the vulnerabilities the state depends on.
How engagement works in Uzbekistan
As an independent, non-aligned prime vendor, Unstrat fields one accountable team that assesses which control systems are most exposed and where a single failure would cascade, then hardens what matters most first. Equipment is end-use certified and sustained in-region. Because critical infrastructure is where a state is most coercible, the non-aligned position keeps the knowledge of Uzbekistan's weaknesses national rather than shared with a major-power supplier.
Defending water and power as one system
An infrastructure engagement in Uzbekistan begins with a briefing and an export-control and end-use confirmation that clears before any representation. One accountable team assesses which supervisory control systems are most exposed and where a single failure would cascade, matching hardening, defensive cyber and counter-UAS to the coupled water and energy networks a densely settled arid population depends on rather than a generic template. What matters most is hardened first, and the programme broadens in phases sustained in-region. Localisation arrangements are scoped per programme, subject to export controls and end-use approvals. Because critical infrastructure is where a state is most coercible, the knowledge of Uzbekistan's weaknesses stays national through a single accountable channel, protecting the essential services the population relies on.
Relevant capability
Critical infrastructure resilience
Capability page →
Monitoring and incident response
Capability page →
Layered defence against the drone threat
Capability page →Adjacent priorities in Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan's ministries, registries and national databases are under continuous attack from criminal and state-linked actors, and as digital government expands, so does the attack surface. A successful intrusion can corrupt a national record, expose citizens' data or paralyse a ministry at a critical moment.
Problem pageCheap unmanned aircraft now threaten airports, energy sites, borders and public events in every region. Layered counter-UAS, combining detection radar tuned to small slow targets, passive sensing and defeat systems, is the affordable answer recent conflicts demand.
Problem pageTapping, bunkering and sabotage of oil infrastructure drain national revenue and cause environmental damage. Persistent overhead surveillance detects illegal connections and vessel movements, while control-system hardening protects the pipeline network itself.
Problem pageRelevant solutions
Power, water, transport and port systems assessed, hardened and watched continuously, by a team with no foreign government to report the findings to.
Solution page →Layered defence against hostile unmanned aircraft: detection, tracking and defeat priced for the mass threat rather than a missile economy that empties the magazine first.
Solution page →Uzbekistan: security context
Uzbekistan's priorities focus on frontier and network security: surveillance of its borders, protection of critical infrastructure, and communications that must stay protected. It is an environment where a landlocked state values capability it can operate and control directly.
One accountable, non-aligned partner gives Uzbekistan a coherent counterpart for those priorities: border surveillance, infrastructure protection and protected communications through a single channel. A security agency gains end-use certified equipment, in-region sustainment and localisation arrangements scoped per programme.
About this challenge
Power grids, water systems and transport networks face both physical and cyber attack. Hardening the control systems behind them, defending the networks around them and countering the drone threat above them keeps essential services running under pressure.
Frequently asked questions
Why must Uzbekistan's water and power be defended together?
Because water management and power depend on the same control networks an attacker would target in an arid, densely settled country, a single intrusion can threaten essential services at once. Hardening the control systems and defending the surrounding networks as one problem closes the door piecemeal defence leaves open.
What does hardening control systems actually prevent?
It reduces the attack surface of the supervisory systems behind power, water and gas, so an intruder cannot manipulate a process, defeat a safety interlock or force a shutdown. Combined with continuous cyber monitoring, it keeps essential services running under pressure.
Who holds the knowledge of Uzbekistan's infrastructure weaknesses?
The national operator does. Hardening, cyber defence and counter-UAS all come from independent, non-aligned makers, so the picture of where the country is most exposed stays national. We would welcome the chance to brief your team on an assessment-first programme.