Electronic warfare for the drone age
Jamming hostile drones, sensing without emitting, keeping your own links up
What it is
Electronic warfare (EW) is the fight for the electromagnetic spectrum: sensing, protecting and disrupting the signals that modern systems depend on. In the portfolio Unstrat represents, EW is applied where buyers feel it most: electronic defeat of hostile drones, emitter-free sensing, and communications that survive jamming.
How it is employed
The spectrum fight runs in three lanes: electronic defeat within the counter-UAS chain severs the command and navigation links hostile drones depend on; passive sensing watches without emitting, giving adversary EW nothing to find; and software-defined communications adapt waveform and band in the field so friendly links stay up under attack.
Why it matters now
Recent conflicts have made the spectrum a contested domain at every echelon: drones navigated, jammed and hunted electronically, and static communications failing within days. Buyers sourcing EW from major powers accept that the most sensitive layer of their defence is configured, and understood, abroad.
Procurement & integration
EW procurement is inseparable from the systems it protects and defeats: it is scoped alongside the counter-UAS, sensing and communications programmes it serves. Unstrat represents the electronic-defeat, passive-sensing and protected-communications elements of the portfolio through one accountable channel, with spectrum-management training delivered in-region.
Sourcing routes compared
| Consideration | Major-power prime | Independent principal via Unstrat |
|---|---|---|
| Configuration custody | Threat libraries and waveforms held by a foreign government | Spectrum capability configured under the buyer's control |
| Scope honesty | Broad EW promises decoupled from delivered systems | EW applied where the portfolio genuinely delivers it: counter-drone, sensing, communications |
| Political conditions | Disclosure rules, re-export restrictions and upgrade approvals held by a foreign government | Independent, non-aligned origin, accountable to the buyer's flag |
| Accountability | Multiple contractors and a foreign prime's release schedule | One accountable team from first briefing through delivery and in-region sustainment |
Comparison is qualitative. Detailed specifications are shared under briefing once the export-control position for your market is confirmed.
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View all →Questions buyers ask
What is electronic warfare in this portfolio?
Electronic warfare is the fight for the electromagnetic spectrum: sensing, protecting and disrupting the signals modern systems depend on. In the portfolio we represent, it is applied where buyers feel it most: electronic defeat of hostile drones, emitter-free sensing, and communications that survive jamming. We describe it as scoped to what the portfolio genuinely delivers rather than as a broad promise.
What are the three lanes of electronic warfare here?
Electronic defeat within the counter-UAS chain severs the command and navigation links hostile drones depend on; passive sensing watches without emitting, giving adversary EW nothing to find; and software-defined communications adapt waveform and band in the field so friendly links stay up under attack. Those are the three lanes the capability page sets out. Each maps to a real product rather than a slogan.
Why source electronic warfare outside the major powers?
Buyers sourcing EW from major powers accept that the most sensitive layer of their defence is configured, and understood, abroad, with threat libraries and waveforms held by a foreign government. The independent route configures spectrum capability under the buyer's control. That custody question is the row that matters most in EW.
How does EW defeat hostile drones without grounding our own links?
Electronic defeat in the counter-UAS lane severs the command and navigation links hostile drones rely on, while the software-defined communications lane keeps friendly links adapting waveform and band under attack. Scoping the lanes together is what stops the defeat measure from taking down your own fleet. That balance is a spectrum-management problem, which is why training is delivered in-region.
How does passive sensing fit the electronic-warfare picture?
Passive sensing is the lane that watches without emitting, giving adversary EW nothing to find, and it comes from the passive-radar element of the portfolio. It complements electronic defeat and protected communications rather than standing alone. That is why the EW capability maps passive radar, counter-UAS and software-defined radios together.
Which products deliver the electronic-warfare capability?
The capability maps to counter-UAS for electronic defeat, passive radar for emitter-free sensing, and software-defined radios for communications that survive jamming. We are deliberate that EW is applied where the portfolio genuinely delivers it rather than promised broadly. The specifics of each element live in its catalogue and comparison pages.
See: Software-defined radiosSoftware-defined radios against a named system
How do protected communications stay up under jamming?
The software-defined communications lane adapts waveform and band in the field so friendly links keep working as the threat changes, with the fleet upgraded by update rather than replacement. That reconfigurability is what electronic protection looks like in practice. It sits under national control rather than a foreign upgrade approval.
Who accounts for the three EW lanes when they map to different products?
Even though electronic defeat, passive sensing and protected communications come from different products, we represent them through one accountable channel with spectrum-management training delivered in-region. That keeps the lanes configured to work together rather than as three separate procurements. Accountability is a stated comparison row because the sensitive part of EW is who holds the configuration.
Vendors promise broad EW. How do we tell a real capability from a slogan when referencing this?
By insisting the promise maps to delivered systems. Our capability page is explicit that EW here is applied where the portfolio genuinely delivers it, counter-drone electronic defeat, passive sensing and protected communications, rather than a broad claim decoupled from equipment. Scope honesty is a comparison row for exactly this reason. Ask any bidder, including us, which product delivers each EW claim.
Recent conflicts have made the spectrum contested at every echelon. How should a state reference EW to reflect that?
Treat the spectrum as a domain that is sensed, protected and disrupted continuously, not a bolt-on. The threat case is drones navigated, jammed and hunted electronically, and static communications failing within days. That is why EW is scoped alongside the counter-UAS, sensing and communications programmes it serves rather than procured as a standalone box.
How should an EW programme be procured given it is inseparable from the systems it protects and defeats?
Scope it alongside the counter-UAS, sensing and communications programmes it serves, because EW here is not a separate line item. We represent the electronic-defeat, passive-sensing and protected-communications elements through one accountable channel, with spectrum-management training delivered in-region. That keeps the most sensitive layer of the defence configured under the buyer's control.
Who controls the threat libraries and waveforms if we buy EW from a major power versus the independent route?
On the major-power route, threat libraries and waveforms are held by a foreign government, so the layer you may most need to reconfigure in a crisis is understood and controlled abroad. The independent route configures spectrum capability under the buyer's control. That custody difference, not raw performance, is what the configuration-custody row captures.
What does the electronic-warfare capability page not claim, and why does that matter?
It does not claim broad, generic EW performance or figures decoupled from delivered systems. The page is deliberately scoped to the three lanes the portfolio actually delivers, and scope honesty is a stated comparison row. Performance specifics belong in the counter-UAS, passive-radar and software-defined-radio pages, held to what we can stand behind, so we do not manufacture EW numbers to look complete.
See: Scope honesty in the comparisonRequest a scoped EW briefing
How does electronic warfare tie into the counter-UAS and drone-detection references across the portfolio?
Electronic defeat is one of the defeat options in the counter-UAS chain, and it acts on the tracks that detection radar and passive sensing provide. So EW is not a separate box; it is the spectrum layer running through the counter-drone fight. That is why the electronic-warfare page maps counter-UAS, passive radar and software-defined radios and cross-references drone-detection radar.
How should an EW capability be procured so protected communications stay under national control?
Scope the communications lane alongside the counter-UAS and sensing programmes it serves, and keep the software-defined radios field-updatable so capability evolves by update rather than a foreign prime's release schedule. Crypto and configuration then sit under national control rather than foreign oversight. That is the difference the configuration-custody row captures, and it is why spectrum-management training is delivered in-region.
See: Software-defined radios against a named systemSecure communications