Defeat mass drone attack at a cost your force can sustain
Counter-UAS & loitering munitions
Overview
Counter-UAS and loitering-munition systems that detect, track and defeat hostile unmanned aircraft, paired with detection radar tuned to small, slow, low-flying targets. The layered, affordable answer to mass drone attack that recent conflicts demand.
A layered counter-drone system that detects, tracks and defeats hostile unmanned aircraft, holds their launch sites at risk, and is built for defence ministries and site owners who need an affordable answer to saturation attack, under their own rules of engagement rather than a foreign supplier's.
Key capabilities
- Layered detection across radar, radio-frequency and electro-optical sensors, with automated friend-or-foe classification to cut operator load.
- Graduated defeat, from electronic disruption through kinetic interception, so the response is matched to the threat and the setting.
- Loitering-munition effectors that hold hostile launch sites, staging areas and operators at risk, not just the drones already in the air.
- A single fused operating picture that turns many sensor feeds into one prioritised, actionable threat track.
- Designed against quantity: an engagement economy that does not spend more to stop an attack than the attack itself costs.
- Man-portable detection for teams operating beyond fixed-site coverage, extending awareness to the patrol.
- Employment under the buyer's own rules of engagement, without foreign end-use conditions on the capability a force may most need to use independently.
Performance envelope
| Detection range | Multiple range classes available |
| Sensor mix | Configuration-dependent |
| Defeat options | Layered, matched to threat and rules of engagement |
| Effector endurance | Subject to mission profile |
| Coverage geometry | Configuration-dependent |
| Environmental envelope | Available under controlled briefing |
| Command-and-control interfaces | Integrated to existing systems on assessment |
| Mobility | Fixed, relocatable and man-portable classes available |
| Detailed figures | Shared under briefing, not published |
Qualitative envelope only. Exact figures are configuration-dependent and shared under a controlled briefing against your requirement: never published.
In depth
Counter-UAS is not a single device but a layered kill chain assembled around the sites and assets a buyer needs to defend. Each layer is chosen for the threat and the environment, and the whole is represented and sustained through one accountable team.
Sensors
Detection radar tuned to small, slow, low-flying targets, radio-frequency sensors that pick up control and video links, and electro-optical trackers that classify and follow a contact. Layering sensor types reduces the blind spots any single sensor leaves.
Effectors
Graduated defeat options, from electronic disruption of the drone's link to kinetic interceptors and loitering munitions, matched to the threat and the rules of engagement so the response is proportionate to what is inbound.
Command layer
A common operating picture that fuses the sensor feeds, applies friend-or-foe classification, and presents the operator with a single, prioritised threat track rather than a wall of raw returns.
Communications
Resilient links between distributed sensors, effectors and the command post, engineered to keep working in a contested electromagnetic environment.
Operator
A human stays in the loop for engagement decisions. Doctrine, drills and training build crews who fight the system rather than merely watch it, and who can hand off between layers under pressure.
Integrations
Interfaces to existing air-defence, command-and-control and site-security systems so counter-UAS augments what a force already operates instead of forcing a rip-and-replace.
Operational problems it addresses
- Protecting airbases, forward operating bases and troop concentrations from reconnaissance and one-way attack drones.
- Shielding critical national infrastructure, from power and water to refineries and ports, against stand-off drone strikes and surveillance.
- Countering saturation and swarm attacks without exhausting a limited stock of high-end interceptors on low-cost threats.
- Denying hostile operators persistent overwatch of manoeuvre, logistics and command nodes.
- Securing borders and coastlines against small, slow, low-flying incursions that conventional air defence is not tuned to see.
- Holding launch teams and staging areas at risk so the attacker cannot operate a drone campaign with impunity.
Deployment configurations
Why Unstrat: the difference
Unstrat is the authorised global representative and distributor for this capability. It is already in service with a track record behind it, so you are buying something that has done the job elsewhere, not funding a first attempt. You are not the test bed.
Versus a single major-power supplier
Buying counter-UAS from a major power attaches disclosure obligations and end-use conditions to exactly the capability a force may most need to use independently. An independent, non-aligned origin keeps employment accountable to the buyer's flag and rules of engagement.
Versus a high-end missile defence alone
Air-defence missiles designed for aircraft and ballistic threats can defeat a drone, but spending a costly interceptor on a cheap drone loses the engagement economy. A layered mix is built to be affordable against quantity, keeping premium interceptors for premium threats.
Versus legacy systems not tuned for the drone threat
Radars and effectors built for fast, high-flying aircraft are not optimised for small, slow, low-flying targets. This capability is designed around the drone profile: detection, classification and defeat tuned to what is actually inbound.
Versus a single-vendor closed solution
One-vendor packages lock a buyer into a fixed sensor-effector mix. Assembling the layer from the best-matched components, and integrating with what a force already operates, avoids a rip-and-replace and keeps future options open.
Versus manual observation and reaction
Relying on operators to spot, identify and react to drones by eye does not scale to saturation. Automated detection and fused classification keep a human in the decision loop while removing the workload that manual watch-keeping cannot sustain.
Versus an off-the-shelf commercial jammer
A commercial jammer addresses one narrow slice of the threat and can be defeated by autonomous or fibre-controlled drones. A layered system covers the detection and defeat gaps a point product leaves open.
How it reaches you
Sovereignty & localisation
- Buyer ownership of operational data and the threat picture the system generates.
- Local control of software configuration and rules-of-engagement settings.
- Options for local assembly and integration of the deployed system.
- In-region maintenance and sustainment rather than remote, supplier-gated support.
- Operator training and train-the-trainer programmes to build a sovereign crew base.
- Progressive technology transfer and component localisation, scoped per programme.
- A path towards independent sustainment so the capability outlasts the initial delivery.
Integration
- Existing air-defence and command-and-control systems, so counter-UAS feeds and receives the common air picture.
- In-service sensors and site-security systems, augmenting current coverage rather than replacing it.
- Existing effectors and engagement-authority chains, keeping human decision-making in the loop.
- Resilient communications and data links suited to a contested electromagnetic environment.
- Mission and situational-awareness software already in use at the command post.
- National and site infrastructure, including power, siting and comms, assessed as part of configuration.
Procurement & delivery
- Engagement begins with a requirement discussion focused on the specific sites and assets to be defended, then builds the sensor-effector mix around them.
- Export-control position and end-user-certificate chain are confirmed before any configuration is represented.
- Demonstration or evaluation, configuration, contracting, delivery and acceptance testing follow the standard programme path.
- Operator training, warranty, spares and in-region sustainment are part of the same accountable engagement.
Counter-UAS & loitering munitions: questions
How does counter-UAS handle a swarm rather than a single drone?
Saturation is the design case, not an afterthought. Layered detection and a fused operating picture let operators triage many tracks at once, and the defeat mix is chosen so the engagement economy holds up against quantity. Graduated effectors handle the volume without exhausting premium interceptors on low-cost threats.
Can this defeat drones that do not use a radio link?
Yes, and that is why the system is layered rather than a single jammer. Autonomous, pre-programmed and fibre-controlled drones defeat radio-frequency countermeasures alone, so radar and electro-optical detection plus kinetic defeat options cover the threats a link-only approach would miss.
Does it hold the launch site at risk, or only the drones in the air?
Both. Loitering-munition effectors extend the response to the operators, launch teams and staging areas behind the attack, so a hostile force cannot run a drone campaign against you with impunity from a safe distance.
Will it integrate with our existing air defence and command systems?
Integration with in-service air-defence, command-and-control and site-security systems is a design goal. Counter-UAS is intended to augment what you already operate and feed the common air picture, not force a rip-and-replace. The specific interfaces are assessed during configuration.
What can you tell us about ranges and performance figures?
Multiple range and coverage classes are available and the envelope is configuration-dependent. Detailed figures are shared under a controlled briefing against your specific requirement rather than published, so the discussion is matched to your sites, threat and rules of engagement.
Who controls the system and the data once it is deployed?
The buyer. Options exist for ownership of operational data, local control of software and rules-of-engagement settings, in-region maintenance, operator and train-the-trainer programmes, and progressive localisation, so the capability is operated and sustained under your own authority.
Why an independent supplier rather than a major-power system?
Major-power counter-UAS typically carries disclosure obligations and end-use conditions on exactly the capability you may most need to use independently. An independent, non-aligned origin keeps employment accountable to your flag and rules of engagement, through one team responsible from briefing to sustainment.
Next step on this capability
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Capability comparisons
Questions buyers ask
What is the best counter-drone system?
There is no single best system, only the right layer mix for the threat you actually face. Electronic defeat is cheap per shot and fails against drones that carry no live radio link; kinetic and net defeat are certain against a named track and cost more per engagement. Our counter-UAS line is built as a layer rather than a box: radar, RF and optical detection with AI friend-or-foe classification, then net-capture, kinetic FPV and loitering-munition effectors cued from the same command layer.
See: Kinetic, electronic and directed-energy defeat comparedCounter-UAS as a solution, not a product line
What is a counter-UAS system?
A counter-UAS system detects, tracks and defeats hostile unmanned aircraft. Detection comes first, because nothing can be defeated that has not been seen, and small, slow, low-flying drones sit below the coverage of legacy air-surveillance radar. Our configuration pairs detection radar tuned to that target set with RF sensing and optical tracking, then hands the track to whichever effector suits the engagement.
See: Counter-UAS capability pageWhy drone-detection radar is a separate discipline
Does jamming stop drones?
It stops the ones still listening. Jamming attacks the control link and satellite navigation, so a drone flying an inertial profile, a pre-set waypoint route or a spooled fibre link offers nothing to deny. It is also indiscriminate while it runs: Aselsan's own documents describe İHTAR jamming mobile bands, Wi-Fi and GNSS alongside drone control links. That is why our defeat layer keeps kinetic and net options in the same architecture rather than betting the site on spectrum.
See: Jamming versus kinetic defeat, side by sideElectronic warfare for the drone age
How much does a counter-drone system cost?
We do not publish prices, and any vendor quoting one before it knows your sites is guessing. The figure that decides the programme is not acquisition cost but cost per engagement: a defence that spends a high-end interceptor on every hobby drone loses the exchange while winning the engagement. Our line is priced around many low-cost effectors under one command layer, with spares and training held in your region rather than freighted from a foreign depot.
See: Cost per engagement against Aselsan, Meteksan and Fortem
Counter-UAS system for protecting an air base against mass drone attack
Base defence is an arithmetic problem before it is a technology problem: how many effectors can you put in the air per minute, and what does each one cost. Our answer is layered detection feeding a mix of net-capture interceptors at a 5 km operating radius, swarm-capable interceptors at up to 150 km/h and kinetic FPV interceptors at 350 km/h and above. Fortem's DroneHunter F700 is the honest counterpoint: reusable, reloaded in under three minutes, and one capture at a time.
See: Counter-swarm architecture above the effectorsWhere Fortem's reload time helps and hurts
Which counter-drone system works against drones with no radio link?
Only a physical one. Fibre-controlled and inertially guided drones have removed the link that every jammer-centred suite depends on, which is the gap in İHTAR 100 and KAPAN as both vendors publish them. Aselsan's own answer is to bolt on the ŞAHİN 40 mm gun, effective to 700 m. Ours carries kinetic FPV interception out to 5 km and net capture with a 30 m throw inside the same system, so the defeat decision does not depend on what the target's radio is doing.
Counter-UAS for an airport that cannot afford GNSS disruption
Civil aviation sites are exactly where wideband jamming becomes unusable, because denying GNSS and mobile bands around a runway trades one safety problem for another. Kinetic and net defeat engage a specific airframe and leave your spectrum alone. Detection still does the heavy lifting: identification, not defeat, is where a credible airport architecture begins, and that is a siting and coverage design against your approach paths.
See: Collateral RF effects in the comparison tableHow the three defeat classes behave over populated ground
Layered counter-UAS for critical national infrastructure on a constrained budget
Start from the assets, not the brochure. A refinery, a dam and a substation have different approach axes, different civilian overflight and different tolerance for debris, and the sensor-effector mix should follow that rather than a standard package. Our line lets you buy detection first and add effectors as the threat picture hardens, with the command layer already in place to cue them.
See: Critical infrastructure resilience programmeAll eight solution hubs
What is the best alternative to Aselsan İHTAR 100?
İHTAR 100 is a mature design and its radar is the part most buyers should envy: Ku-band pulsed Doppler, 360 degree scanning at 30 rpm, automatic classification of low, slow and small targets. The narrowness is on the defeat side, where the published effector is programmable RF jamming and hard kill arrives only by integrating ŞAHİN or the GÖKBERK laser. Our system covers the same detection functions and carries kinetic, net and electronic defeat inside one supported line, sold without a foreign ministry's view of your next operation attached.
Our air force keeps being offered Turkish and American counter-drone suites. What can a non-aligned state buy that will not be frozen by someone else's foreign policy?
Turkish counter-UAS is competent and increasingly available, but it is national industry on national terms: Aselsan states on its own datasheets that it is a Turkish Armed Forces Foundation company. American equipment brings its own licence chain. Our counter-UAS line is supplied by a non-aligned group, spares travel without a third-party veto, and sustainment sits in your region rather than at a factory you cannot visit. That is the axis to weigh first, because a counter-drone system is only as available as its spares.
See: Supplier origin and export conditions comparedCounter-UAS solution hub
What detection range should we write into a counter-UAS tender, and what does your system actually publish?
Write the range against a stated target size, altitude and terrain, or the number means nothing. We publish effector figures rather than an integrated detection range: a 5 km operating radius for the net-capture interceptor, kinetic defeat out to 5 km, endurance of 10 to 30 minutes by system. For benchmarking, Meteksan publishes up to 2.5 km for KAPAN and Fortem 2 to 3.5 km against Group 1 and 2 drones. Ask us for measured figures on the radar in your configuration instead of assuming parity from a brochure.
We fly our own ISR and delivery drones over the same site. How do we defeat hostile drones without grounding our own fleet?
This is the question that eliminates omnidirectional jamming from most defended sites. A jammer covering GNSS, LTE, Wi-Fi and control links does not know which airframes are yours, and İHTAR's swarm mode is explicitly omnidirectional. Our architecture discriminates friend from foe across mixed traffic first, then allocates a net, kinetic or electronic effector to an individual track, so friendly flights continue while the attack is broken.
See: Friend-foe discrimination in the swarm architectureEffect on friendly RF and GNSS, vendor by vendor
How many drones arriving at once will saturate a counter-UAS system, and how should we test that during evaluation?
Test it as an allocation problem: how many tracks the command layer holds, how many effectors it can cue concurrently, and the cycle time from track to engagement. We do not publish a simultaneous-track figure, and you should hold us to producing one for your configuration. Fortem publishes 50 configurable tracks on the TrueView R30; Aselsan and Meteksan state multi-target tracking without a number. Put a live multi-target run in the acceptance criteria and make every vendor fly it.
What does a counter-drone system really cost to own over ten years once spares, training and consumables are included?
The recurring bill is where these programmes are won or lost. Fortem's datasheet makes the shape of it visible: an 18 kg interceptor, nets and drogue chutes consumed per capture, a 75-minute battery recharge and reload in under three minutes. Ours spreads the cost differently, with low-cost interceptors produced in volume and support based in your country, so the recurring line items are spares and training rather than freight to a foreign depot and a service contract you cannot audit.
See: Cost of ownership against DroneHunter F700Operator training in the same line
Is this equipment already in service, or would we be funding a demonstrator?
This is production equipment rather than a demonstrator. Radar, RF and optical sensing, net-capture and kinetic interceptors and a loitering-munition option ship as one supported line, and the sustainment stock is placed in the buyer's region instead of a foreign depot. What we will not do is print a performance figure that has not been measured on the radar you are actually buying, which is why several rows in our comparison tables say so plainly.