Attacks on critical infrastructure: Jordan
Jordan's water, power and transport systems are lifelines in a resource-scarce kingdom, and their disruption would ripple far beyond the sites themselves. These networks face both physical and cyber threats, and the small-drone risk over them is now real. Keeping essential services running under pressure is a core resilience requirement.
Hardening the systems the country runs on
Protecting Jordan's critical infrastructure means working on three layers at once: hardening the control systems that run water, power and transport, defending the networks around them, and countering the drone threat above them. Infrastructure hardening secures the industrial control systems themselves, defensive cyber protection guards the surrounding networks around the clock, and counter-UAS layers address the small unmanned aircraft that can now reach a sensitive site cheaply. Together they keep essential services running when they are targeted.
Scarcity raises the stakes
Water is a strategic resource in Jordan, and the systems that move and treat it are as critical as any power grid, so an attack on utilities carries outsized national consequence. Because these are civilian systems that must keep operating, the defensive layers have to protect availability, not just detect intrusion. That makes control-system resilience and continuity the measure of success rather than the number of alerts raised.
How engagement works in Jordan
Unstrat represents the hardening, cyber and counter-drone makers directly as an independent, non-aligned prime vendor, giving Jordan one accountable team for a layered defence. Systems are supplied end-use certified with sovereign-controlled encryption, and defensive operations are designed to be run by Jordanian personnel with in-region sustainment. Because the makers are non-aligned, the defence of the kingdom's essential services answers to Jordan alone.
Building a layered defence for Jordan's lifelines
The engagement opens with a briefing on the water, power and transport sites whose disruption would carry outsized national consequence, so the layered defence is prioritised where scarcity raises the stakes. Export-control clearance and end-use confirmation are settled before any representation, so one accountable team stands behind the hardening, cyber and counter-drone makers. Capability is matched to the operator's conditions (the control systems in service, the networks around them, the small-drone threat above them), so the aim is continuity and availability, protecting the services the kingdom runs on. Sustainment is phased in-region so Jordanian personnel run the defence themselves, with localisation arrangements scoped per programme, subject to export controls and end-use approvals, keeping the mission answerable to Jordan alone.
Relevant capability
Critical infrastructure resilience
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Monitoring and incident response
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Layered defence against the drone threat
Capability page →Adjacent priorities in Jordan
Jordan's ministries, registries and national databases are under continuous pressure from criminal and state-linked actors. These are the systems the state runs on, and their compromise would undermine both governance and public trust. The defence they need must be accountable to Jordan's government, not a foreign one.
Problem pageCheap unmanned aircraft launched from unstable neighbouring territory now threaten Jordan's borders, energy sites and public spaces. Recent conflicts across the region have shown how affordable and disruptive this threat has become. A layered counter-drone answer is no longer optional for the kingdom.
Problem pageTapping, bunkering and sabotage of oil infrastructure drain national revenue and cause environmental damage. Persistent overhead surveillance detects illegal connections and vessel movements, while control-system hardening protects the pipeline network itself.
Problem pageRelevant solutions
Power, water, transport and port systems assessed, hardened and watched continuously, by a team with no foreign government to report the findings to.
Solution page →Layered defence against hostile unmanned aircraft: detection, tracking and defeat priced for the mass threat rather than a missile economy that empties the magazine first.
Solution page →Jordan: security context
Jordan's priorities are shaped by long, sensitive frontiers: border surveillance across demanding terrain, counter-terrorism vigilance, and communications that must stay protected. It is an environment that rewards persistent monitoring and the assurance that sensitive traffic remains sovereign.
An accountable single-channel engagement gives the Kingdom a coherent counterpart for that assurance, border surveillance, counter-terrorism support and protected communications. A defence ministry gains disciplined export-control handling, end-use certified equipment and localisation arrangements scoped per programme rather than promised in advance.
About this challenge
Power grids, water systems and transport networks face both physical and cyber attack. Hardening the control systems behind them, defending the networks around them and countering the drone threat above them keeps essential services running under pressure.
Frequently asked questions
Why does Jordan need a layered approach to infrastructure protection?
Because critical sites face physical, cyber and drone threats at once, and defending only one layer leaves the others open. Combining control-system hardening, network defence and counter-UAS keeps water, power and transport running under pressure. A briefing can prioritise the layers for your sites.
How does water scarcity change the priority in Jordan?
Water systems are as strategic as the power grid in a resource-scarce kingdom, so their control systems and continuity demand the same protection. The goal is keeping the service available, not just detecting an intrusion after the fact.
Who operates the defensive systems?
Jordanian personnel do. Capability is delivered end-use certified with keys held nationally and sustained in-region, so the defence of essential services is run by Jordan rather than a foreign contractor.