Attacks on critical infrastructure: Iraq
Iraq's power, water and transport networks are under pressure from both physical sabotage and cyber intrusion, even as the country rebuilds them. Disruption to these systems undermines daily life and public confidence alike. Keeping essential services running under attack is central to Iraq's stability.
Three layers of defence at once
Protecting Iraq's critical infrastructure means hardening the control systems that run power, water and transport, defending the networks around them, and countering the drone threat above them. Infrastructure hardening secures the industrial control systems themselves, defensive cyber protection guards the surrounding networks continuously, and counter-UAS layers address the small aircraft that can now reach a sensitive site cheaply. Together they keep essential services operating when they are targeted.
Reconstruction as a vulnerability and an opportunity
Iraq's infrastructure is being renewed after years of strain, which is both a moment of exposure and a chance to build in resilience from the start rather than bolting it on later. The same sites are targeted by insurgent sabotage, drone attack and cyber intrusion, so a layered defence serves several threats simultaneously. Designing protection into the network as it is rebuilt is far more effective than defending fragile systems after the fact.
How engagement works in Iraq
Unstrat represents the hardening, cyber and counter-drone makers directly as an independent, non-aligned prime vendor, giving Iraq one accountable team for a layered defence. Systems are supplied end-use certified with sovereign-controlled encryption, and defensive operations are designed to be run by Iraqi personnel with in-region sustainment. Non-aligned sourcing keeps the defence of Iraq's essential services answerable to Iraq alone.
Designing resilience in as Iraq rebuilds
The engagement opens with a briefing timed to reconstruction, so protection is designed into the power, water and transport networks as they are renewed rather than bolted onto fragile systems later. Export-control clearance and end-use confirmation come before any representation, so one accountable team stands behind the hardening, cyber and counter-drone makers. Capability is matched to the operator's real conditions (the control systems being renewed, the networks around them, the drone threat above them, and the sabotage the same sites face), so the layered defence protects several threats at once and keeps essential services running. Sustainment is phased in-region so Iraqi personnel run the defence themselves, with localisation arrangements scoped per programme, subject to export controls and end-use approvals, keeping the mission answerable to Iraq alone.
Relevant capability
Critical infrastructure resilience
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Monitoring and incident response
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Layered defence against the drone threat
Capability page →Adjacent priorities in Iraq
Iraq's ministries, registries and national databases face continuous attack from criminal and state-linked actors as the state digitises its functions. These are the systems governance runs on, and their compromise would undermine institutions and public trust. The defence they need must be accountable to Iraq's government, not a foreign one.
Problem pageSmall unmanned aircraft have become a routine threat over Iraq's bases, energy sites and public spaces, launched cheaply by non-state actors. Recent conflicts across the region have made the danger unmistakable and affordable to mount. A layered counter-drone capability is now a baseline requirement for Iraqi security.
Problem pageIraq's economy rests overwhelmingly on its oil, and every barrel tapped, bunkered or diverted illegally drains the national revenue that reconstruction depends on. The pipeline and field network stretches across terrain from the southern fields to the north, much of it hard to watch from the ground. Protecting that revenue is inseparable from protecting the state's finances.
Problem pageRelevant solutions
Power, water, transport and port systems assessed, hardened and watched continuously, by a team with no foreign government to report the findings to.
Solution page →Layered defence against hostile unmanned aircraft: detection, tracking and defeat priced for the mass threat rather than a missile economy that empties the magazine first.
Solution page →Iraq: security context
Iraq's security environment turns on protecting the sources of national income and stability: oil infrastructure vulnerable to theft and attack, a continuing counter-terrorism requirement, and airspace that must be watched. Priorities of this scale call for durable, sustainable capability rather than one-off provision.
One accountable, non-aligned partner gives Iraq a coherent counterpart for those priorities: infrastructure protection, counter-terrorism support and airspace defence through a single channel, with transparent export-control handling. A security agency gains end-use certified equipment, in-region sustainment and localisation arrangements scoped per programme rather than promised in advance.
About this challenge
Power grids, water systems and transport networks face both physical and cyber attack. Hardening the control systems behind them, defending the networks around them and countering the drone threat above them keeps essential services running under pressure.
Frequently asked questions
Why does Iraq need a layered infrastructure defence?
Because power, water and transport sites face sabotage, drone attack and cyber intrusion at once, and defending one layer leaves the others exposed. Combining hardening, network defence and counter-UAS keeps essential services running. A briefing can prioritise the layers for your sites.
How does reconstruction change the approach in Iraq?
Rebuilding infrastructure is a chance to design resilience in from the start rather than adding it later. Layered protection built into the network as it is renewed is far more effective than defending fragile legacy systems.
Who runs the defensive systems?
Iraqi personnel do. Capability is delivered end-use certified with keys held nationally and sustained in-region, so the defence of essential services is Iraqi-run rather than dependent on an outside contractor.