Cyber attacks on government: Iraq
Iraq's ministries, registries and national databases face continuous attack from criminal and state-linked actors as the state digitises its functions. These are the systems governance runs on, and their compromise would undermine institutions and public trust. The defence they need must be accountable to Iraq's government, not a foreign one.
Defending the systems a state runs on
Protecting Iraq's government networks needs around-the-clock defensive operations that watch, detect and respond continuously, backed by authorised red-teaming that finds weaknesses before an adversary does. For the most sensitive functions, security architectures built for disconnected environments keep isolated systems protected even where connectivity cannot be trusted. The aim is to keep ministries, registries and databases running and confidential under sustained attack.
Sovereignty of the defence itself
For Iraq, who defends the network matters as much as how well it is defended, because a security operation sees everything it protects. The national interest lies in defensive capability that Iraqi people operate, with the architectures and tooling owned nationally. That keeps the state's most sensitive data inside the state rather than exposed to whoever is contracted to guard it, a particular concern given the many external interests active in the region.
How engagement works in Iraq
Unstrat represents the defensive, authorised-offensive and off-grid cyber makers directly as an independent, non-aligned prime vendor, so one accountable team stands behind the whole capability. Systems and playbooks are delivered so Iraqi personnel run the security operation themselves, with sustainment kept in-region. Because the makers are non-aligned, the defence of Iraq's government systems is accountable to Iraq alone.
Keeping government cyber defence accountable to Iraq
The engagement begins with a briefing on the ministries, registries and databases governance runs on as the state digitises, so defence is scoped around the functions whose compromise would most damage institutions and trust. Export-control clearance and end-use confirmation come before any representation, so a single accountable team stands behind the defensive, authorised-offensive and off-grid cyber makers. Capability is matched to the operator's real conditions (the systems in use, the sensitivity of the data, the environments where connectivity cannot be trusted), so the defence, and everything it sees, stays inside the state rather than exposed to whoever guards it. Sustainment is phased in-region, transferring operations and playbooks to Iraqi personnel who run and test the defence themselves, with localisation arrangements scoped per programme, subject to export controls and end-use approvals, keeping it accountable to Iraq alone.
Relevant capability
Adjacent priorities in Iraq
Banks and payment infrastructure are the most attacked civilian systems in any economy. Threat monitoring and protection built for financial institutions safeguards transactions, data and public confidence in the financial system.
Problem pageIraq's power, water and transport networks are under pressure from both physical sabotage and cyber intrusion, even as the country rebuilds them. Disruption to these systems undermines daily life and public confidence alike. Keeping essential services running under attack is central to Iraq's stability.
Problem pageFor Iraq's security forces operating across contested terrain and against adaptive adversaries, protecting command traffic is fundamental. Unprotected networks hand an adversary the operational picture for free. Sovereign-controlled communications are the baseline on which counter-terrorism, border and infrastructure missions all depend.
Problem pageRelevant solutions
Iraq: security context
Iraq's security environment turns on protecting the sources of national income and stability: oil infrastructure vulnerable to theft and attack, a continuing counter-terrorism requirement, and airspace that must be watched. Priorities of this scale call for durable, sustainable capability rather than one-off provision.
One accountable, non-aligned partner gives Iraq a coherent counterpart for those priorities: infrastructure protection, counter-terrorism support and airspace defence through a single channel, with transparent export-control handling. A security agency gains end-use certified equipment, in-region sustainment and localisation arrangements scoped per programme rather than promised in advance.
About this challenge
Ministries, registries and national databases are under continuous attack from criminal and state-linked actors. Around-the-clock defensive operations, authorised red-teaming and architectures for disconnected environments protect the systems a state runs on, accountable to your government, not a foreign one.
Frequently asked questions
Why should Iraq run its own government cyber defence?
Because a security operation sees everything it protects, and the state's most sensitive data should not be visible to an external party. Capability delivered for Iraqi personnel to operate keeps the defence, and the data, national. A briefing can outline how the transition is supported.
What does authorised red-teaming add?
It finds weaknesses in government systems before a real adversary does, under authorisation and control, complementing the around-the-clock defensive operations that watch the networks continuously.
How are the most sensitive systems protected?
With security architectures built for disconnected environments, so isolated systems stay protected even where connectivity cannot be trusted, keeping the most critical functions defended and national.