Cyber attacks on government: Jordan
Jordan's ministries, registries and national databases are under continuous pressure from criminal and state-linked actors. These are the systems the state runs on, and their compromise would undermine both governance and public trust. The defence they need must be accountable to Jordan's government, not a foreign one.
Defending the systems a state runs on
Protecting Jordan's government networks calls for around-the-clock defensive operations that watch, detect and respond continuously, backed by authorised red-teaming that finds weaknesses before an adversary does. For the most sensitive functions, security architectures built for disconnected environments keep isolated systems protected even where connectivity cannot be trusted. The aim is to keep ministries, registries and databases running and confidential under sustained attack.
Sovereignty of the defence itself
For a government, who defends the network matters as much as how well it is defended: a foreign-run security operation sees everything it protects. Jordan's interest is in defensive capability that its own people operate, with the architectures and tooling owned nationally. That keeps the state's most sensitive data inside the state, rather than exposed to whoever is contracted to guard it.
How engagement works in Jordan
Unstrat represents the defensive, authorised-offensive and off-grid cyber makers directly as an independent, non-aligned prime vendor, so one accountable team stands behind the whole capability. Systems and playbooks are delivered so Jordanian personnel run the security operation themselves, with sustainment kept in-region. Because the makers are non-aligned, the defence of Jordan's government systems is accountable to Jordan alone.
Bringing government cyber defence in-house in Jordan
The engagement begins with a briefing on the ministries, registries and databases the state runs on, so defence is scoped around the functions whose compromise would most undermine governance and trust. Export-control clearance and end-use confirmation are settled before any representation, so a single accountable team stands behind the defensive, authorised-offensive and off-grid cyber makers. Capability is matched to the operator's real conditions (the systems in use, the sensitivity of the data, the environments that cannot trust connectivity), so the defence, and everything it sees, stays inside the state. Sustainment is phased in-region, transferring the operations and playbooks to Jordanian personnel so they run and test the defence themselves, with localisation arrangements scoped per programme, subject to export controls and end-use approvals, keeping it accountable to Jordan alone.
Relevant capability
Adjacent priorities in Jordan
Banks and payment infrastructure are the most attacked civilian systems in any economy. Threat monitoring and protection built for financial institutions safeguards transactions, data and public confidence in the financial system.
Problem pageJordan's water, power and transport systems are lifelines in a resource-scarce kingdom, and their disruption would ripple far beyond the sites themselves. These networks face both physical and cyber threats, and the small-drone risk over them is now real. Keeping essential services running under pressure is a core resilience requirement.
Problem pageFor a kingdom operating amid several active conflicts on its doorstep, protecting command traffic is fundamental. Unprotected networks hand an adversary the operational picture for free, and Jordan's security forces range across terrain where infrastructure is sparse and interference likely. Sovereign-controlled communications are the baseline on which every other capability depends.
Problem pageRelevant solutions
Jordan: security context
Jordan's priorities are shaped by long, sensitive frontiers: border surveillance across demanding terrain, counter-terrorism vigilance, and communications that must stay protected. It is an environment that rewards persistent monitoring and the assurance that sensitive traffic remains sovereign.
An accountable single-channel engagement gives the Kingdom a coherent counterpart for that assurance, border surveillance, counter-terrorism support and protected communications. A defence ministry gains disciplined export-control handling, end-use certified equipment and localisation arrangements scoped per programme rather than promised in advance.
About this challenge
Ministries, registries and national databases are under continuous attack from criminal and state-linked actors. Around-the-clock defensive operations, authorised red-teaming and architectures for disconnected environments protect the systems a state runs on, accountable to your government, not a foreign one.
Frequently asked questions
Why should Jordan run its own government cyber defence rather than outsource it?
Because a security operation sees everything it protects, and the state's most sensitive data should not be visible to an external party. Capability delivered for Jordanian personnel to operate keeps the defence, and the data, national. A briefing can outline how the transition is supported.
What does authorised red-teaming add?
It finds the weaknesses in government systems before a real adversary does, under authorisation and control, so defences are tested rather than assumed. It complements the around-the-clock defensive operations that watch the networks continuously.
How are the most sensitive systems protected?
With security architectures built for disconnected environments, so isolated systems stay protected even where connectivity cannot be trusted, keeping the most critical functions defended and national.