Communication satellites
Resilient satellite communications
Overview
Sovereign satellite communications from a firm that has built and launched satellites and ground stations: LEO smallsat constellations at 400–600 km with sub-30 ms latency, encryption under national key management and spectrum filings held by the nation, not a foreign operator that can throttle, surveil or switch you off.
Assured connectivity you control, free of coalition access conditions.
Capabilities
- LEO smallsat constellations at 400–600 km: round-trip latency under 30 ms, revisit measured in minutes, latency parity with terrestrial fibre
- End-to-end encryption under national key management, so no foreign operator holds decryption authority for government or military traffic
- Spectrum sovereignty: ITU frequency filings held by the nation, secured before commercial operators pre-empt the 6G non-terrestrial slots
- Direct-to-device connectivity to standard smartphones per 3GPP Release 17/18 non-terrestrial network standards
- Resilience by design: national ground stations and inter-satellite cross-links that survive the loss of any single point
- Quantum key distribution payloads available as a hosted addition on the same constellation
Specifications
| Orbit | Available under controlled technical briefing |
| Latency | Available under controlled technical briefing |
| Encryption | National key management |
| Spectrum | ITU filings held by the nation |
| Direct-to-device | Available under controlled technical briefing |
| Origin | Independent / non-aligned |
In depth
Keep the link under national authority
The communication-satellite record covers LEO smallsat constellations at 400–600 km, with round-trip latency under 30 ms and revisit measured in minutes. It describes latency parity with terrestrial fibre and direct-to-device connectivity to standard smartphones under 3GPP Release 17/18 non-terrestrial network standards. These are distinct parts of the offer. A buyer can assess the orbit and latency for the required link, the direct-to-device requirement for ordinary handsets, and the communications architecture needed to keep services available. The product is presented as sovereign satellite communications from a firm that has built and launched satellites and ground stations. Its stated use is assured connectivity, including government or military traffic, where the question is not only whether capacity exists but who controls it. National key management means a foreign operator does not hold decryption authority for that traffic. Spectrum sovereignty is addressed through ITU frequency filings held by the nation rather than by a foreign operator. The control question therefore has separate answers for encryption, spectrum and operations. The catalogue assigns the keys, ground stations, traffic logs and kill-switch to the buyer, while the constellation's orbit, latency and direct-to-device options describe how the service is delivered.
Resilience has several layers
The catalogue identifies national ground stations and inter-satellite cross-links as resilience measures designed to survive the loss of any single point. It also lists quantum key distribution payloads as a hosted addition on the same constellation. These options do not replace the need to define the mission. The required traffic, users, ground facilities, key authority and spectrum position still have to be established before a configuration can be represented. A satellite link is one part of the communications system. Ground stations provide the national interface, while encryption and spectrum arrangements determine who can use the service and under what authority. The available product record therefore puts ownership and control beside orbital performance. It does not claim that every option is present in every constellation. LEO orbit, latency, direct-to-device service, cross-links and quantum key distribution are configuration elements to be assessed against the buyer's requirement.
Procure the whole control path
The communications capability is related to ground stations, mission-control software and high-frequency emergency communications. That relationship reflects the practical path from spacecraft capacity to an operating national service. Ground stations handle the terrestrial interface. Mission-control software provides planning, tasking, telemetry and fleet operations from the buyer's facilities. An independent emergency communications layer can be considered where the requirement includes infrastructure-independent HF networks, but that is a related capability rather than an unqualified feature of the satellite constellation. The detail record puts more control points in the buyer's hands: encryption keys, ground stations, traffic logs and the kill-switch. Those controls are different from the orbital figures. A constellation can have the stated LEO orbit and latency while the authority over keys, logs, spectrum and service interruption is settled separately. The direct-to-device option also has a defined boundary. It is connectivity to standard smartphones under the listed 3GPP Release 17/18 non-terrestrial network standards, not a general claim that every handset or network is supported. The catalogue describes an independent, non-aligned origin and a one-team model. It does not name customers or deployments, and the available record does not provide a case study. A procurement discussion should therefore settle the constellation configuration, ground segment, ITU filing position, key-management authority, direct-to-device requirement and export eligibility before detailed claims are made.
Why Unstrat: the difference
Unstrat is the authorised global representative and distributor for this capability. It is already in service with a track record behind it, so you are buying something that has done the job elsewhere, not funding a first attempt. You are not the test bed.
Independent, non-aligned origin, with no political exposure to any major-power ecosystem.
One accountable team from first briefing through delivery and in-region sustainment.
You hold the encryption keys, the ground stations, the traffic logs and the kill-switch.
How it reaches you
Related capability
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Procurement & sustainment
Classification and the end-user-certificate chain are confirmed before this capability is represented to your market.
Sourced from an independent manufacturer: no major-power disclosure rules or political conditions.
A single team responsible from first briefing through delivery: not a chain of foreign primes to integrate yourself.
Lifecycle support and operator training delivered in-region, building capability that outlasts the initial deployment.
Applications it supports
Capability comparisons
Questions buyers ask
What is sovereign satellite communications?
It means the nation holds the things that decide whether the network keeps working: the encryption keys, the ground stations, the traffic logs and the authority to switch it off. Buying spacecraft does not deliver any of those on its own. Our programme covers the constellation at 400 to 600 km, national ground stations, encryption under national key management and ITU filings held by the nation, delivered as an operating service rather than a design study.
See: Communication satellitesCompared with NanoAvionics and GomSpace
LEO or GEO satellite communications: which has lower latency?
LEO, by a wide margin, because the signal travels a few hundred kilometres instead of tens of thousands. Our constellation operates at 400 to 600 km with round-trip latency under 30 ms, which is parity with terrestrial fibre for most applications. GEO retains advantages in coverage per satellite, so the choice depends on whether your traffic is interactive or broadcast.
What is direct-to-device satellite connectivity?
It is satellite service to an ordinary, unmodified smartphone, without a dish or a specialist terminal. Ours supports it under the 3GPP Release 17 and 18 non-terrestrial network standards. It is a constellation and spectrum question as much as a spacecraft question, which is why platform vendors like NanoAvionics and GomSpace do not address it in their bus datasheets, and why it needs to be a written requirement early enough to shape the ITU filing.
Military satellite communications without a foreign kill switch
The cipher is not the control point; key custody and service suspension authority are. GomSpace publishes AES256 encryption and authentication on its platform kits, which is a strong cipher, but the published material does not state who holds the keys. Our arrangement puts key management and the kill authority with the nation, and no foreign operator holds decryption authority for government or military traffic.
See: Encryption and key authority comparedSecure communications solution
Who should hold ITU spectrum filings for a national constellation?
The nation, and earlier than most ministries expect. Frequency rights are finite and are being claimed now, particularly the non-terrestrial slots that 6G handset connectivity will use. A country that buys spacecraft without filings has bought an expensive way to rent somebody else's spectrum later. Neither the NanoAvionics nor the GomSpace platform datasheet addresses spectrum at all, which is not a criticism of the hardware, only a warning about what the price covers.
Satellite communications that reach ordinary phones during a disaster
Direct-to-device connectivity under 3GPP Release 17 and 18 puts service on handsets that citizens already carry, which is the difference between a functioning alert system and a warehouse of terminals nobody can distribute in time. Our constellation supports it, and the national ground stations and inter-satellite cross-links are designed so the network survives the loss of any single point. Make it a requirement before the spectrum filing rather than after.
Should we buy a satellite bus or a communications programme?
If your team already has spectrum, a ground network and operators, a bus is an efficient buy: the MP42 publishes up to 1 Gbps on X-band and both it and the GomSpace kits are rated for five years in LEO. If you are starting from a policy commitment rather than an engineering department, a platform purchase leaves the hard parts undone, because spectrum, filings, ground stations, key custody and an operations centre are where national programmes actually stall. Those are the items our contract is written around, and they should be priced as one scope.
See: What is being sold, side by sideSovereign space solution
How resilient is a LEO constellation to losing a satellite or a ground station?
That is an architecture question rather than a spacecraft question. Our design uses national ground stations and inter-satellite cross-links so the network survives the loss of any single point, which is the property that matters when a site is damaged or a satellite fails early. NanoAvionics publishes intersatellite link options on the MP42, LEO to LEO and LEO to GEO, so the technique is well established across the sector.
See: Inter-satellite links comparedCommunications capability brief
We have a political commitment to sovereign communications but no engineering department. What do we actually need to procure?
Five things, and the spacecraft is only one of them: the constellation, the ground stations, an ITU filing position, a key management arrangement and an operations centre with trained staff. Bus vendors sell the first item well and leave the rest to you. Our programme covers all five as one contract, delivered by a supplier that has built and launched satellites and ground stations, so the equipment arrives as a working service rather than a set of parts awaiting integration.
See: Communication satellitesCompared with NanoAvionics and GomSpaceSovereign space solution
Can a foreign operator throttle, read or switch off our government traffic?
If they generate and hold the keys, or if they operate the service under their own licence, then yes, at least in principle. This is the question to put in writing to every bidder: who holds the keys, who can suspend service, and which government's licence would be needed to restore it after a political disagreement. Our answer is that key management sits with the nation, the ground stations are yours, and no foreign operator holds decryption authority for government or military traffic.
What happens to our constellation if relations with the supplier's government change?
With an EU or NATO member-state supplier, spares, software loads and constellation expansion pass through that state's export system, and export systems change with governments. NanoAvionics sits in the Lithuanian and Norwegian chain, GomSpace in the Danish one, and neither can remove that step. Our origin is non-aligned and the ground segment, keys and filings sit with you, so the worst case is a commercial dispute rather than a diplomatic one.
Is quantum key distribution worth including in a national satellite programme now?
It is worth deciding now even if you deploy later, because retrofitting a payload class into a flying constellation is expensive and slow. We offer quantum key distribution payloads as a hosted addition on the same constellation, which keeps the option open without a second programme. Neither the NanoAvionics nor the GomSpace platform datasheet addresses it, so if this matters to your cryptographic roadmap, raise it during architecture rather than at the first refresh.
How does building a national constellation compare with leasing capacity from an international operator?
Leasing is faster, cheaper in the short term and requires no filings or engineers, and for many civil requirements it is the right answer. What it does not give you is control over who can throttle the link, who sees the traffic pattern and whose commercial priorities decide capacity during a regional crisis. A national constellation costs capital and time and repays over a long horizon, so the test is whether the traffic in question is something you could tolerate losing for a week.
See: Sovereign ground segment against a data serviceCommunications capability brief
What throughput and constellation size should we expect for national coverage?
We do not publish per-satellite throughput or the constellation size needed for continuous national coverage, and you should ask us for both in writing rather than accept a description. The published platform figures give useful reference points: the MP42 states up to 1 Gbps on X-band with 8 W output, and the GomSpace kits state up to 225 Mbps on X-band. Those are bus capabilities rather than delivered service rates, so insist that every bidder answers in terms of user-level throughput over a defined area.
Our traffic is currently carried by a foreign operator. How do we migrate without an outage?
In stages, with the ground segment and key management moved before the traffic. The sequence that works is to establish national ground stations and the key arrangement first, run parallel carriage while the constellation builds out, then cut over service by service starting with the least time-critical. Our ground stations and control facilities are delivered and sustained equipment carrying live tasking, telemetry and reception, so the migration target exists as working infrastructure rather than a plan.
Communication satellites: questions
What are Communication satellites?
Communication satellites are Unstrat's Space (Space Domain) capability: Sovereign satellite communications from a firm that has built and launched satellites and ground stations: LEO smallsat constellations at 400–600 km with sub-30 ms latency, encryption under national key management and spectrum filings held by the nation, not a foreign operator that can throttle, surveil or switch you off.
How do Communication satellites work?
Communication satellites deliver their effect through LEO smallsat constellations at 400–600 km: round-trip latency under 30 ms, revisit measured in minutes, latency parity with terrestrial fibre, End-to-end encryption under national key management, so no foreign operator holds decryption authority for government or military traffic and Spectrum sovereignty: ITU frequency filings held by the nation, secured before commercial operators pre-empt the 6G non-terrestrial slots, capabilities matched to the requirement and confirmed under briefing rather than published.
Who makes Communication satellites?
Communication satellites are built by The Satellite Programme Partner, whose focus is satellites & sovereign space programmes. Unstrat represents The Satellite Programme Partner to government and enterprise buyers worldwide as an independent, non-aligned prime vendor.
Who uses Communication satellites?
Government and enterprise buyers acquire Communication satellites to address contested & denied communications across the space domain, matched to the mission and accountable to them, not to a foreign vendor's government.
Why choose Communication satellites over a major-power alternative?
Communication satellites are sourced from an independent, non-aligned manufacturer, so they carry no major-power disclosure rules, upgrade-locks or political ramifications. Concretely: you hold the encryption keys, the ground stations, the traffic logs and the kill-switch. The capability is accountable to you, not to a foreign vendor's government and its release schedule.
How are Communication satellites procured, and where can it be exported?
Assured connectivity you control, free of coalition access conditions. Every engagement begins with a briefing, and export eligibility is confirmed per market under briefing rather than published. Where controlled capabilities are involved, the classification and end-user-certificate chain is confirmed first. Communication satellites are then sustained in-region by one accountable team from briefing through long-term operation.