Defence & security capability for Iraq
Independent, non-aligned capability for Iraq: end-use certified, politically unconditioned and sustained through one accountable channel.
Security themes
Security context
Iraq's security environment turns on protecting the sources of national income and stability: oil infrastructure vulnerable to theft and attack, a continuing counter-terrorism requirement, and airspace that must be watched. Priorities of this scale call for durable, sustainable capability rather than one-off provision.
One accountable, non-aligned partner gives Iraq a coherent counterpart for those priorities: infrastructure protection, counter-terrorism support and airspace defence through a single channel, with transparent export-control handling. A security agency gains end-use certified equipment, in-region sustainment and localisation arrangements scoped per programme rather than promised in advance.
Security priorities
Iraq's economy rests overwhelmingly on its oil, and every barrel tapped, bunkered or diverted illegally drains the national revenue that reconstruction depends on. The pipeline and field network stretches across terrain from the southern fields to the north, much of it hard to watch from the ground. Protecting that revenue is inseparable from protecting the state's finances.
Problem pageIraq's hard-won stability is still tested by insurgent and terrorist networks that exploit its western deserts, porous borders and unprotected communications. Its security forces need a decisive information edge to stay ahead of an adaptive adversary. That edge should come from a supplier with no political agenda attached to it.
Problem pageSmall unmanned aircraft have become a routine threat over Iraq's bases, energy sites and public spaces, launched cheaply by non-state actors. Recent conflicts across the region have made the danger unmistakable and affordable to mount. A layered counter-drone capability is now a baseline requirement for Iraqi security.
Problem pageIraq's power, water and transport networks are under pressure from both physical sabotage and cyber intrusion, even as the country rebuilds them. Disruption to these systems undermines daily life and public confidence alike. Keeping essential services running under attack is central to Iraq's stability.
Problem pageIraq's borders run for great distances across desert, marsh and mountain, adjoining several neighbours whose stability varies. Long stretches of the frontier are effectively unwatched, letting armed groups, smugglers and irregular movement exploit the gaps. Turning that porous line into a monitored one, under sovereign control, is a priority for the state.
Problem pageContraband, fuel and untaxed goods cross Iraq's borders wherever surveillance is thinnest, draining customs revenue and financing illicit networks. Diverted fuel in particular is a persistent drain in an oil economy. Making the smuggling routes visible protects both the treasury and wider security.
Problem pageFor Iraq's security forces operating across contested terrain and against adaptive adversaries, protecting command traffic is fundamental. Unprotected networks hand an adversary the operational picture for free. Sovereign-controlled communications are the baseline on which counter-terrorism, border and infrastructure missions all depend.
Problem pageIraq's ministries, registries and national databases face continuous attack from criminal and state-linked actors as the state digitises its functions. These are the systems governance runs on, and their compromise would undermine institutions and public trust. The defence they need must be accountable to Iraq's government, not a foreign one.
Problem pageIraq's custodial facilities hold individuals whose escape or continued coordination would carry serious security consequences. Drones now deliver contraband over walls, and escapes are increasingly coordinated through compromised networks. Closing these modern gaps in custodial security is a direct contribution to counter-terrorism and public safety.
Problem pageIraq operates ageing aircraft, vehicles and vessels that stay in service well beyond their original design life, as is common in much of the world. Verifying that this equipment remains structurally sound is essential to keeping it available and safe. Doing so independently of the original manufacturer's schedule gives Iraq control over its own sustainment.
Problem pageSustaining Iraq's security forces across its western deserts and other remote regions exposes convoys and strains budgets. The distances are long, the routes vulnerable and the connectivity thin. Keeping remote operations supplied and connected is a persistent logistical and communications challenge for the state.
Problem pageHow an engagement takes shape in Iraq
Iraq's security priorities turn on protecting the sources of national income and stability: oil infrastructure vulnerable to theft and attack, a continuing counter-terrorism requirement, and airspace that must be watched. An engagement that answers those priorities has to deliver durable, sustainable capability across dispersed sites and demanding terrain rather than one-off provision that cannot be maintained. The advantage of a single accountable counterpart is that infrastructure protection, counter-terrorism support and airspace defence are handled through one coherent channel rather than a fragmented set of unaccountable supply relationships.
Unstrat engages as one accountable, non-aligned channel representing independent manufacturers directly, not as a distributor and not on behalf of any major power. That non-aligned position matters because Iraq's defensive decisions should answer to national command alone, without external conditions on where and how capability is used. A security agency gains end-use certified equipment, transparent export-control handling and in-region sustainment that keeps systems serviceable over the long campaign these priorities demand. The mission is to protect the infrastructure and the airspace the state cannot afford to lose, extending an advantage it operates for itself.
A programme typically begins by strengthening protection and awareness over the highest-value fixed sites and the airspace above them, then broadens into a shared picture that national crews operate and sustain. Localisation arrangements are scoped per programme, subject to export controls and end-use approvals, and cover support, training and deeper local participation where a given programme allows, defined against that programme rather than promised in advance. Because the makers behind the capability are non-aligned, the picture it produces and the decisions drawn from it stay under national control.
Relevant solutions
Power, water, transport and port systems assessed, hardened and watched continuously, by a team with no foreign government to report the findings to.
Solution page →Persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance across land, sea and air, tasked on national priorities and accountable to the flag that owns it.
Solution page →Command-and-control links that adapt in the field and keep working where terrestrial networks cannot reach, owned outright with no partner able to listen in or cut the line.
Solution page →Layered defence against hostile unmanned aircraft: detection, tracking and defeat priced for the mass threat rather than a missile economy that empties the magazine first.
Solution page →Hardened control systems, security that works with the network down, and inspection that certifies the physical estate, the unglamorous half of national defence that decides the loud half.
Solution page →Relevant capability

Field-assembled ISR airframes

Earth observation imagery

Critical infrastructure resilience

Reconfigurable tactical communications

Layered defence against the drone threat

Monitoring and incident response

Emitter-free surveillance

Secure disconnected operations

Red-team and assessment
